THE YEAR IN REVIEW 2004:
SELECTED CASES FROM THE ALASKA
SUPREME COURT, THE ALASKA COURT OF
APPEALS, AND THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Year in Review is a collection of brief summaries of
selected state and federal appellate cases concerning Alaska law
from the year 2004. They are neither comprehensive in breadth
(several cases are omitted) nor in its depth (many issues within
individual cases are omitted). Attorneys should not rely on these
summaries as an authoritative guide; rather, they are intended to
alert the Alaska legal community about judicial decisions from the
previous year. The summaries are grouped by subject matter and
presented alphabetically within each grouping.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Alaska Center for the Environment v. Rue,1 the supreme
court found that, although the Fish and Game Commissioner
misconstrued the definition of a “subspecies” under Alaska law,
the commissioner’s ruling against extending endangered status to
the Cook Inlet beluga whale was valid.2 Several environmental
1
2

95 P.3d 924 (Alaska 2004).
Id. at 927.

groups petitioned the Commission under the state Endangered
Species Act to protect the Cook Inlet beluga, whose population had
dramatically decreased over the last decade.3 The Commission
found that new federal regulations would correct and control this
problem and declined to extend endangered status to the beluga.4
The supreme court upheld the ruling under a rational basis review.5
Applying a “substitution of judgment” standard, however, the court
held that the Commission incorrectly limited the term “subspecies”
to a narrow taxonomic category.6 Instead, the court determined
that “subspecies” may be more broadly defined, with consideration
given to relevant scientific information, and held that this broader
standard should guide the commission in future evaluations of the
belugas’ status.7
In Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. v. Knowles,8 the
supreme court held that Alaska law requires the appointment of a
FRANK commission to assess the costs of a proposed
governmental relocation only after the voters pass such an
initiative.9 Alaska Statutes section 44.06.060 requires that the
legislature establish a commission to determine costs associated
with relocating a “present function of state government.”10
Alaskans for Efficient Government, Inc. (AFEG) filed suit in
response to a ballot initiative that proposed moving the legislature,
arguing that state law requires the appointment of a FRANK
Commission to determine the costs of relocation before voters vote
on a relocation initiative.11 The superior court adopted the
government’s interpretation of the statute, which called for the
creation of a commission only after a relocation initiative had
passed.12 The supreme court affirmed, holding that based on the
statute’s own language, as well as its context and public policy, the
correct interpretation calls for the creation of a FRANK
commission only after a relocation initiative is passed as a ballot
measure.13
In Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium v. Settlement
Funds Held for E.R.,14 the supreme court held that the Consortium
can enforce a health care provider lien on settlement proceeds
3

Id. at 926.
Id.
5
Id. at 928.
6
Id. at 931.
7
Id. at 933.
8
91 P.3d 273 (Alaska 2004).
9
Id. at 274.
10
ALASKA STAT. § 44.06.060 (Michie 2004).
11
91 P.3d at 274–75.
12
Id. at 275.
13
Id. at 278.
14
84 P.3d 418 (Alaska 2004).
4
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received by Alaska Native patients from third-party tortfeasors.15
The Consortium entered a health care provider lien for the value of
services provided to Warden after Warden was injured in an
automobile accident.16 Allstate, the tortfeasor’s insurer,
subsequently settled with Warden to cover all losses.17 Warden’s
attorney informed and sent the Consortium the amount of
settlement after he deducted his attorney fees from the settlement.
18
The Consortium refused to endorse the check and filed a
complaint for the remaining fees.19 The court held that federal law
allows for the enforcement of the Consortium’s health care
provider lien because a tribal organization providing health
services has the right to recover reimbursement from third parties
for reasonable expenses.20 Additionally, the court held that the
Consortium’s health care provider lien must be reduced by the pro
rata share of the patient’s attorney’s fees.21
In Alaska Trademark Shellfish v. State,22 the supreme court
held that the Aquatic Farming Act precluded the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game (“Department”) from issuing
exclusive rights to harvest and sell wild geoduck clam stocks that
existed on aquatic farms.23 Alaska Trademark Shellfish and other
shellfish farmers (“applicants”) filed an application with the
Department for permits to harvest and sell geoduck clams.24 The
Department ruled that the farmers would only be permitted to use
the wild geoduck clams for brood stock or active cultivation rather
than for harvest and sale.25 The Department therefore refused to
issue the permits unless the applicants could develop a method to
distinguish farmed from wild geoduck clams and would agree to
use the proposed method when farming.26 The applicants refused
to comply, and their applications were denied.27 The superior
court affirmed the Department’s decision.28
On appeal, the State argued that the Aquatic Farming Act
prohibited the Department from issuing exclusive rights to harvest
and sell wild geoduck stocks that already existed on the applicants’

15

Id. at 421.
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 421–22.
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Id. at 422.
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Id. at 424.
21
Id. at 428.
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91 P.3d 953 (Alaska 2004).
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Id. at 959.
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Id. at 954.
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Id. at 954.
27
Id. at 955.
28
Id.
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farm sites.29 The court agreed with the State, noting that the
operation permit statute30 only allows the Department to grant
farmers permits to acquire and sell stock that is used or reared for
the purpose of further growth or propagation, which precludes the
harvesting of unfarmed, wild stock.31 Similarly, the stock
acquisition permit statute32 only allows permit-holders to acquire
aquatic plants or shellfish from wild stock in order to supply stock
to the Department or to a licensed aquatic hatchery or farm; it does
not grant a right to harvest wild geoducks for general commercial
purposes.33 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the Department’s
denial of the applications for aquatic farming permits.34
In Anderson v. Alaska Bar Association, 35 the supreme court
held that while the superior court lacks jurisdiction to review
appeals from the Alaska Bar Association regarding attorney
misconduct, the Alaska Supreme Court may review these
matters.36 Anderson alleged cases of attorney misconduct and filed
a grievance with the Alaska Bar Association, but the Bar Counsel
denied his request for an investigation.37 Anderson appealed the
administrative agency’s decision to the superior court; the case was
dismissed, and he appealed to the supreme court.38 The supreme
court held that it has the authority to hear appeals regarding
grievance-closing decisions made by the Alaska Bar Association
pursuant to Bar Rule 22(a).39 The appropriate standard of review
is whether the Bar Counsel abused its discretion in denying the
request for an investigation.40
In Boyd v. Artic Slope Native Association,41 the supreme
court held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board erred in
ignoring testimony from a claimant’s treating psychiatrist42 but
was within its discretion to implicitly deny the claimant’s motion
to exclude certain evidence.43 After the Board denied her workers’
compensation claim, Boyd challenged the decision, alleging that
the Board failed to make adequate findings and violated her due

29

Id. at 958.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.100 (Michie 2004).
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91 P.3d at 958.
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ALASKA STAT. § 16.40.120.
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91 P.3d at 958.
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Id. at 960.
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91 P.3d 271 (Alaska 2004).
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Id. at 272.
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Id. at 271.
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Id. at 272.
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Id.
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Id.
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No. S-10793, 2004 Alas. LEXIS 77 (Alaska 2004).
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Id. at *12.
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Id. at *20.
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process rights.44 The supreme court held that, although the
Board’s findings do not have to be exhaustive, the Board must
make some findings for every material contested issue.45 Hence,
the Board erred in failing to consider disputed testimony from
Boyd’s treating psychiatrist,46 and in failing to explain what
inferences it drew from an investigator’s report about the work
incident that allegedly caused Boyd’s illness.47
The court also found that the Board’s failure to rule
explicitly on Boyd’s motion to exclude expert witnesses was not an
abuse of discretion because the Board implicitly denied the motion
by relying on those witnesses’ testimony in reaching its decision.48
The court concluded that the Board did not violate Boyd’s due
process rights because it held a hearing on the motions to exclude,
it was not bound by any formal rules of civil procedure, and Boyd
had adequate access to the testimony via discovery.49
In Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Dena’ Nena’
Henash,50 the supreme court held that at least some of Dena’ Nena’
Henash’s properties were eligible for charitable-purpose tax
exemptions and that most of the exemption applications should
have been granted by the borough.51 Dena’ Nena’ Henash, a
regional Native nonprofit corporation that provides services
throughout the interior of Alaska, applied to the borough for
charitable-purposes tax exemptions on several parcels of its real
property.52 The borough denied the application after finding that
the corporation was funded largely through government money.53
The corporation appealed the assessor’s decision.54 The supreme
court used a two-part inquiry to determine tax-exempt status: (1)
whether there is a nonprofit, charitable purpose and (2) whether the
property is being exclusively used for an exempt purpose.55 The
supreme court concluded that a property does not necessarily lose
tax-exempt status by deriving a profit56 or because of government
financial support.57 The court refused to limit its analysis to the
factors advanced by the borough, preferring to consider any
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relevant circumstances in the charitable-purpose analysis.58 The
supreme court held that some, but not all, of Dena’ Nena’
Henash’s properties were eligible for charitable-purpose
exemption.59
In Libertarian Party of Alaska, Inc. v. State,60 the supreme
court upheld a soft money regulation promulgated by the Alaska
Public Offices Commission.61 The Campaign Disclosure Act
specifically restricts “hard money” 62 contributions and more
generally limits campaign expenditures for the purpose of
influencing an election.63 The Alaska Libertarian Party challenged
the regulation, which required that political parties disclose “soft
money” contributions and expenditures.64 Finding that soft money
can be used to avoid hard money limitations, the supreme court
ruled that the disclosure requirement fulfilled the Act’s public
information purposes.65 The regulation was consistent with Alaska
law and therefore was a legitimate exercise of the Commission’s
authority.66 The supreme court affirmed the superior court in
denying an injunction and sustaining the regulation.67
In Mechanical Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. State,68 the
supreme court held that the Department of Public Safety and the
Department of Community and Economic Development had the
authority to adopt the International Mechanical Code (IMC)
because it conformed to the requirements of the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA).69 Plaintiff argued that adoption of the IMC
violated statutory authority70 and was inconsistent with the
Uniform Mechanical Code.71 The court held that the agencies had
statutory authority to adopt a code different from the Uniform
Mechanical Code because the legislature did not intend to confine
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Id. at 135.
Id. at 126, 143.
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101 P.3d 616 (Alaska 2004).
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Id. at 617.
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“‘Soft money’ and ‘hard money’ are exclusive categories. ‘Hard
money’ refers to donations made for the purpose of influencing the
nomination or election of a candidate. ‘Soft money’ is most easily
defined negatively as donations to political parties that are not ‘hard
money,’ thus not made directly for the purpose of influencing the
nomination or election of a candidate.”
Id. at 617–18.
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Id. at 618.
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Id. at 620.
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Id. at 626–27.
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Id. at 622.
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Id.
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91 P.3d 240 (Alaska 2004).
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Id. at 242.
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Id. at 251.
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them to the Uniform Mechanical Code.72 Moreover, the court held
that adoption of the IMC did not violate the APA because it was a
reasonable decision, and a fiscal note was not required.73
In Nason v. State,74 the court of appeals upheld a statute75
requiring the Department of Public Safety to collect DNA samples
from individuals convicted of felony “crimes against a person.”76
Nason argued the State violated his privacy under the Alaska State
Constitution and Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution by requiring submission of a DNA sample and
criminalizing refusal.77 Nason also argued that the statute violated
the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution because
only individuals convicted of “crimes against a person” were
required to submit.78 The court presumed that the statute was
constitutional in the absence of contrary authority; it did not
address the merits of the Fourth Amendment argument.79
However, the court held that the equal protection argument failed
because there was a valid reason to require a sample from
individuals convicted of felonies against a person.80 The court
chose to limit its holding because of the difficult constitutional
issues presented by the case.81
In Simpson v. State,82 the supreme court affirmed the
decisions of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
(“CFEC”) to limit the number of permits in a non-distressed area
and to deny Simpson skipper status in 1984.83 CFEC decided to
limit the number of permits to seventy-three for the Northern
Southeast Inside sablefish fishery.84 The CFEC then set up a point
system to determine order of priority for permit applicants based
on past participation and economic dependence.85 Simpson
applied for a permit and claimed sixty-five points.86 CFEC
awarded him fifty points, concluding he did not qualify as a
skipper in 1984.87 The superior court affirmed.88 The supreme
72
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court held that CFEC has the authority to limit permits in nondistressed fisheries as long as it sets “the maximum number at a
level that is no lower than the highest number of units of gear
fished in any one year of the four years prior to the limitation.”89
The court also held that the CFEC did not err in denying Simpson
skipper status in 1984.90 Under clear statutory language, Simpson
did not qualify as a skipper because he lacked the requisite
license.91
In State v. Greenpeace, Inc.,92 the supreme court upheld the
application of a public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine.93 Greenpeace appealed a ruling of the Alaska
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) issuing a water use
permit to an oil company.94 The appeal triggered an automatic stay
on the permit, which was lifted upon a motion by the oil company
on one day’s notice.95 Greenpeace appealed to the superior court,
arguing that the lifting of the stay was clear error, and the
extremely short notice amounted to a denial of due process.96 The
company subsequently notified DNR that it no longer needed the
permit.97 Although the water use permit was no longer in dispute,
the superior court continued the action under the doctrine of the
public interest exception to mootness, ultimately holding that
lifting the stay was arbitrary and clear error.98 On appeal, the
supreme court held that, although the permit’s expiration rendered
the controversy technically moot, the superior court rightly
considered the due process claim under the public interest
exception because a similar dispute could arise again and might
never be heard if the mootness doctrine were rigidly applied, and
also because the issue was vitally important to the public.99 The
supreme court further held that review of the merits of the decision
to lift the stay did not fall under the public interest exception
because DNR amended the regulation granting an automatic stay
and future similar disputes would not arise.100 The supreme court
held that the public interest exception should not allow a “proxy”
decision on the water use permit and vacated the award of
attorney’s fees to Greenpeace.101
89

Id. at 611.
Id. at 614.
91
Id. at 614–15.
92
96 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2004).
93
Id. at 1068–69.
94
Id. at 1059.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1059–60.
98
Id. at 1061.
99
Id. at 1062–63.
100
Id. at 1068–69.
101
Id.
90

8

In State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe,102 the supreme court held
that the Alaska Joint Boards of Fisheries and Game did not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating a regulation103 that
identified nonsubsistence areas.104 The superior court held that
the regulation was inconsistent with Alaska state law.105 The
supreme court disagreed and upheld the disputed regulation as
originally adopted, finding that the Boards did not exceed their
discretion because they gave careful consideration to the proper
criteria in their evaluation of the starting boundaries for the
nonsubsistence areas.106
In State v. Municipality of Anchorage,107 the supreme court
held that an electricity subsidiary of the Municipality of Anchorage
was exempt from a state tax on gas for the gas it produced for city
use.108 The state argued that the tax should apply because
municipalities were not expressly listed as statutory exceptions.109
The supreme court held that state law exempted municipalities
from tax absent an express provision to the contrary.110 The court
found no legislative intent to apply the gas production tax to
municipalities; therefore, the gas used by the subsidiary to produce
electricity for Anchorage was exempt from taxation.111
III. BUSINESS LAW
In Disotell v. Stiltner,112 the supreme court held that the
Alaska Uniform Partnership Act113 does not require liquidation of
partnership assets upon dissolution, even upon request by a
lawfully dissolving partner.114 Disotell and Stiltner formed a
partnership to construct and operate a hotel but were unable to
agree on the details of their plan, leading Disotell to seek
dissolution of the partnership.115 Disotell argued that he could
demand liquidation under the Partnership Act because he did not
wrongfully cause the dissolution.116 The supreme court held that

102
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liquidation was discretionary and that the lower court did not err in
permitting Stiltner to acquire Disotell’s partnership interest.117
In Hallam v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,118 the supreme court
held that a pro se litigant cannot represent a class in an unfair trade
practices and antitrust action.119 Claiming that the airline breached
a series of contracts by failing to honor various terms of his airline
tickets, Hallam sued the airline.120 He also contended, on behalf of
a class of passengers, that the airline’s standard ticket terms and
policies contravened Alaska’s Fair Trade Practices Act121 and state
antitrust law.122 The superior court dismissed all of Hallam’s
claims, and he appealed.123 The supreme court affirmed these
holdings because Hallam’s appeal challenged findings of fact that
were not clearly erroneous;124 the supreme court also affirmed the
dismissal of Hallam’s unfair trade practices and antitrust claims
because the plain language of the Federal Airline Deregulation Act
preempted such claims.125
In Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.,126 the supreme
court affirmed the re-imposition of litigation-ending sanctions
against Hikita and Alaska Foods, Inc. (collectively Alaska Foods)
for failing to produce pretrial discovery.127 Prior to the present
appeal, the court had already remanded once for the trial court’s
consideration of possible and meaningful alternatives to its
sanctions against Alaska Foods.128 On remand, the superior court
did, in fact, consider lesser sanctions but renewed its dismissal
based on a finding that additional monetary sanctions or a
contempt citation would not cure compliance with discovery
requirements.129 The supreme court affirmed, holding that the
superior court did not abuse its discretion by relying on Alaska
Foods’ actions after the initial grant of sanctions in 1990.130
In Industrial Commercial Electric, Inc. v. McLees,131 the
supreme court reversed the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment for McLees.132 McLees, a former Industrial Commercial
117
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Electric employee, and his wife took several corporation
documents,133 and to recover them, the president of Industrial
Commercial Electric entered into a settlement and release
agreement with them.134 Both the corporation and the president
filed a suit against the McLees, and the McLees filed
counterclaims.135 The lower court granted summary judgment for
the McLees, finding that the corporation’s claims were barred by
the settlement agreement and mutual releases.136 However, the
supreme court held that the settlement agreement and mutual
releases would not bar a claim if they are invalid.137 The court
concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the president was induced to sign the agreement by a
fraudulent misrepresentation, and whether his reliance was
justified.138 The court declined to hold that a releasing party is
never justified in relying on factual representations of a released
party during settlement of claims which accused the released party
of fraud or dishonesty.139 The supreme court reversed the grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.140
In Matanuska Electric Association v. Chugach Electric
Association,141 the supreme court held that Chugach did not breach
its contractual obligation to act in accordance with “prudent utility
practice” when it failed to comply with terms outlining the
procedures for submitting proposed rate changes to a state
regulatory agency.142 Matanuska claimed that Chugach had
violated its obligations under a purchase-and-sale agreement to act
according to “prudent utility practice” and to submit proposed rate
changes to a joint committee of company executives before
submitting them to the Regulatory Commission of Alaska.143 The
supreme court reversed the superior court's grant of summary
judgment for Chugach on the “prudent utility practice” claim,
holding that the lower court erred in finding that the contract
imposed no such duty.144 However, the supreme court affirmed
summary judgment for defendants with respect to the proposed
rate changes, holding that under the terms of the contract the
133
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disputed rate changes were exempt from the joint committee
process.145
In Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Waterman,146
the supreme court held that the business judgment rule does not
apply to situations where the plain language of a corporation’s
bylaws contradicts an action by its board of directors.147 Janecek
was elected to a seat on the board of directors of Matanuska
Electric Association (MEA),148 but after discovering his failure to
disclose some campaign contributions, the board voted not to seat
Janecek.149 Waterman, an MEA board member, successfully sued
to compel the board to seat Janecek.150 The supreme court rejected
MEA’s argument that the business judgment rule protected the
board’s decision not to seat Janecek151 because the plain language
of MEA’s bylaws allows any candidate in violation of campaign
disclosure rules to cure such violations within thirty days.152
Because Janecek complied with the bylaws and cured his
violations, the board did not have the business discretion to unseat
him.153
In Runyon v. Association of Village Council Presidents,154
the supreme court held that the Association of Village Council
Presidents (AVCP), a non-profit corporation consisting of fifty-six
Alaska Native villages, was not entitled to the protection of the
villages’ tribal sovereign immunity and could be sued by private
parties.155 Parents of students who were injured while attending a
Head Start program operated by AVCP sued the corporation for
negligence in failing to adequately train the Head Start teachers.156
AVCP filed motions to dismiss, asserting immunity from suit
based on the tribal sovereign immunity of its incorporating
villages.157 The superior court granted the motions to dismiss, and
the parents appealed to the supreme court.158 The issue on appeal
was whether the incorporating villages were the real parties in
interest to the suit such that their sovereign immunity could extend
to the corporation.159 The court held that the villages were not the
145
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real parties in interest because a judgment against AVCP would
not reach any village assets.160 The villages’ use of the corporate
form to shield their assets from liability precluded the extension of
sovereign immunity to AVCP, and therefore the suit against AVCP
was remanded to the superior court and allowed to proceed.161
In Sourdough Development Services, Inc. v. Riley,162 the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s approval of a settlement
agreement that required Sourdough to pay the receivership
expenses accrued prior to either an acquisition or dissolution of the
company.163 The court refused to review the trial court’s Alaska
Civil Rule 79 award of litigation costs to the shareholders under an
abuse of discretion standard, and instead found that contractual
interpretation of the settlement agreement was the appropriate
review of whether receivership expenses should be paid by the
company or the shareholders.164 The court held that the agreement
expressly provided for payment of receivership costs by the
company.165 Therefore, the court required the company to pay
such costs and declined to tax them as Rule 79 litigation costs.166
In Western Star Trucks v. Big Iron Equipment Service,
167
Inc., the supreme court held that the Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act168 applies to both cases involving
consumer goods and services as well as commercial transactions
involving personal property or services used by businesses.169 Big
Iron, a parts and service dealer, relied to its detriment on an oral
agreement that it entered into with Western Star, a manufacturer of
commercial trucks, to establish a dealership.170 Western Star
subsequently rejected Big Iron’s dealership application, and Big
Iron filed suit against Western Star claiming breach of contract,
promissory estoppel, intentional or negligent misrepresentation,
and unfair trade practices.171 Western Star Trucks argued that the
scope of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
was limited to consumer goods or services and thus did not apply
to business transactions involving personal property or services
used by businesses.172 Based on the plain language and legislative
history of the statute, the court found that non-real estate
160
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commercial transactions are covered under the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act.173
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW
In Alaska Community Colleges’ Federation of Teachers v.
University of Alaska,174 the supreme court held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under
Alaska Civil Rule 82.175 The university prevailed on an appeal
reversing an arbitrator’s award to the teachers’ union.176 The
union argued that the award was unfair because it was obligated to
defend the arbitration award that led to the awarding of fees.177
The court held that the union was not a public interest litigant, and
thus was not covered by the public policy exception to Rule 82.178
The court affirmed the fee award as within the trial court’s
discretion.179
In Alderman v. Iditarod Properties, Inc.,180 the supreme
court affirmed the trial court’s judgment awarding unpaid rent and
prejudgment interest to Iditarod Properties, but reversed that
party’s award of enhanced attorney’s fees.181 Iditarod, owner of
the Fourth Avenue Theater in Anchorage, rented space in that
building to the Aldermans.182 In 1997, the Aldermans moved their
business next door and operated under the name “Fourth Avenue
Theater Trolley Tours,” prompting Iditarod to sue for trademark
infringement.183 In 2001, the supreme court held that Alderman
infringed Iditarod’s trademark and upheld an award of enhanced
attorney’s fees to Iditarod.184 The court also vacated the judgment
for unpaid rent because the Aldermans had suffered substantial
prejudice due to Iditarod’s unduly delayed pleading of breach of
contract claim.185 Iditarod subsequently filed a new complaint
against the Aldermans seeking damages for breach of the rental
agreement.186 The supreme court held that the claim for unpaid
rent was not barred by res judicata because it was a separate and
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distinct claim from the trademark infringement action.187 The
court also held that the action was not barred by the statute of
limitations, which had not tolled.188 Finally, the court found that
enhanced fees were not warranted because the court should not
consider settlement negotiations in awarding enhanced fees.189
In Kozevnikoff v. Tanana Village Council,190 the supreme
court held that notations made by a clerk on an order of the court
do not constitute judicial orders.191 After prevailing on a motion to
dismiss, the Council requested attorney’s fees 192 under Alaska
Civil Rule 82.193 The court entered a final judgment awarding
attorney’s fees, but left the amounts blank, and on the certificate of
distribution a clerk wrote “w/ out cost or atty fees.” 194
Kozevnikoff argued that the clerical notation constituted a denial
of fees.195 The court held that the clerical notations were not
judicial orders, and that orders may be issued prior to making final
calculations of awards of attorney’s fees and costs.196
In Lakosh v. Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation,197 the supreme court affirmed the propriety of the
superior court’s judgment and denial of motions.198 Lakosh filed
an original suit contesting the validity of select regulations issued
by the Department of Environmental Conservation (“DEC”), but
subsequent events transpired that validated the regulation by
statutory amendment.199 As Lakosh’s pending claim involved the
superceded statute, and did not address the validity of the statutory
amendment, Lakosh filed a motion seeking to amend his complaint
to contest the amendment.200 Additionally, prior to the
amendment’s passage but after the original regulation was held to
be invalid, Lakosh filed motions to compel discovery, for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and for a status
conference.201 Lakosh also sought sanctions for the DEC, and
restitution for the DEC’s lack of compliance.202 The court
reviewed the denials of the motion to amend and the motion to
187
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compel discovery under an abuse of discretion standard and found
that no such abuse existed.203 The court further held that the
superior court did not err by failing to award relief or restitution to
Lakosh.204 In so holding, the court noted that there was no merit in
Lakosh’s claims for restitution from unjust enrichment or in the
claim for an equitable remedy.205 Finally, the court also found no
merit in Lakosh’s final appellate claim that the superior court erred
in “presenting its sua sponte motion … for entry of final
judgment”; rather, the court held that the superior court was not
acting sua sponte, but on instructions from the supreme court in
entering final judgment.206
In Maloney v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co.,207 the
supreme court held that an insurance company obliged to make a
policy limits settlement offer has no duty to include the attorney’s
fees allowed under Alaska Civil Rule 82 as part of that offer when
the claimant is not represented by counsel.208 A Progressive policy
holder struck Maloney’s car, seriously injuring Maloney.209
Progressive’s settlement offer did not include Rule 82 attorney’s
fees, because Maloney was unrepresented by counsel at the time of
the settlement, and the terms of the settlement offer did not require
the payment of attorney’s fees for unrepresented parties.210
Maloney argued that the settlement should account for the future
retention of counsel.211 The court rejected Maloney’s policy
arguments based on the language of the settlement agreement.212
In Miller v. Safeway, Inc.,213 the supreme court held that all
of Miller’s claims failed summary judgment, but that the trial
court’s failure to allow Miller leave to amend constituted error.214
Miller, an Alaska Native, was terminated from his job at a Safeway
store because his long hair violated Safeway company policy.215
Miller originally claimed that the termination was unlawful
because it violated his right to privacy and constituted
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, and race.216 The
supreme court held that none of his claims survived summary
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judgment, and affirmed the trial court in this respect.217 However,
the court held that the failure to reach a decision on the merits of
the claims in Miller’s amended complaint resulted in significant
hardship to Miller, and that litigating those claims would not
prejudice Safeway.218 The court therefore reversed and remanded
the trial court’s decision denying Miller’s motion to amend his
complaint.219
In Simeon v. State,220 the court of appeals held that a
lawyer’s decision not to request a jury instruction on a lesser
included offense was a reasonable tactical decision.221 Simeon
appealed his conviction for sexual assault in the first degree and
argued that his conviction should be overturned because his lawyer
failed to request jury instructions of lesser included offenses of
sexual assault.222 Simeon’s lawyer admitted that it was a mistake
not to request instructions to the jury on lesser included
offenses.223 However, the court held that a lawyer has the ultimate
authority to make tactical trial decisions including whether to
request lesser included offenses.224 In general, the court held that
to successfully challenge a tactical decision made by an attorney,
the defendant must demonstrate that the tactic was one that no
competent attorney would use.225
In Thomann v. Fouse,226 the supreme court held that
Fouse’s settlement offer was too indefinite to qualify as an offer of
judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 68.227 Thomann sued Fouse for
injuries resulting from an automobile accident.228 Before trial,
Fouse offered to settle for $25,000 plus medical costs to be
determined through arbitration.229 Thomann declined the offer and
was subsequently awarded $29,018.88 at trial, including medical
costs.230 The lower court awarded Fouse with post-offer costs and
attorney’s fees under Rule 68 because Thomann’s damage award
was less than Fouse’s offer.231 The supreme court reversed and
held that Fouse’s offer was indefinite and did not constitute an
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unconditional commitment to satisfy Thomann’s medical bills.232
Therefore, the offer did not meet the requirements of Rule 68 and
Fouse was not entitled to costs and attorney’s fees.233
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Alaska Legislative Council v. Knowles,234 the supreme
court held that the definition of “appropriations” in article II of the
Alaska Constitution extends only to monetary transfers.235 The
governor had vetoed a bill transferring state land to the University
of Alaska.236 In attempting to override the veto, the legislature had
the two-thirds majority required to enact a bill over the governor’s
objection if the bill was not an “appropriation” under article II, but
not the three-quarters majority required if it was an “appropriation”
under that article.237 Here, a two-thirds majority was sufficient to
override the governor’s veto because the transfer at issue was not
an appropriation.238 In reaching its conclusion, the court adopted
different definitions of “appropriation” as that word is used in
article II and in article XI of the Alaska Constitution. Although it
found the idea of consistent definitions “appealing,”239 the court
reasoned that article XI was designed to prevent “give-away
programs and maintain legislative control over the allocation of
state assets,” whereas article II was designed to “govern the
balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of
Alaska's government.”240 Because the articles serve different
purposes, the court concluded that different definitions were
appropriate.241 The court also rejected the notion that dedicating
income derived from the land constituted an “appropriation”
because the amount of income derived from the land was not
sufficiently certain.242
In Crawford v. State,243 the court of appeals held that,
under certain circumstances, statements that a criminal defendant
made after receiving his Miranda warnings must be suppressed.244
Crawford admitted under police questioning that he had marijuana
232
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and cocaine in his car, was subsequently advised of his Miranda
rights, and then once again admitted to the drug possession under
police interrogation.245 The trial court suppressed Crawford’s
statements made prior to the Miranda warnings, but admitted the
post-Miranda statements.246 On appeal, Crawford argued that the
post-Miranda statements should have been similarly suppressed.247
The court chose not to reach the state constitutional issue of
whether to adopt the older Brown v. Illinois248 “dissipation of
taint” test versus the modern Oregon v. Elstad249 analysis for postMiranda statements, and held that under either federal test
Crawford’s post-Miranda statements would be suppressed.250
In Doe v. State,251 the supreme court held that the Alaska
Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA)252 violated the due
process right of an individual whose conviction was set aside
before ASORA became effective.253 In 1987 Doe was convicted
of child sexual abuse, but his conviction was set aside in April
1994.254 ASORA became effective in August 1994.255 The
Department of Public Safety (DPS) created a regulation applying
ASORA to all defendants, regardless of whether a conviction was
set aside.256 Doe argued that ASORA should not be applicable in
his case because it is unconstitutional and DPS does not have the
authority to create such regulations.257 Since ASORA did not
become applicable to set-aside convictions until after Doe’s
conviction had been set aside, the court held that imposing
ASORA’s registration requirement on Doe violated due process
because the government could not state a compelling interest to
justify this requirement.258
In Doe v. Tandeske,259 the Ninth Circuit uphrlf Alaska’s
Sex Offender Registration Act260 against procedural and
substantive due process challenges.261 Doe argued that Alaska’s
registration law violated procedural due process because it
245
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infringed upon a liberty interest with notice or a hearing.262 The
court held these procedural safeguards had already been provided
at the trial that resulted in Doe’s conviction.263 The court also
rejected Doe’s substantive due process claim, because convicted
sex offenders do not have a constitutional liberty interest in
freedom from registration and the Alaska statute was reasonably
related to the legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety.264
Thus, summary judgment for the state was affirmed.265
In Dunn v. Municipality of Anchorage,266 the court of
appeals affirmed Dunn’s sentence for driving under the
influence.267 Dunn challenged the validity of the sentencing statute
on equal protection and due process grounds; he argued that the
State did not have a reasonable basis for expanding a ten-year
“look-back” limitation to a new provision requiring courts to
examine all previous DUI convictions.268 The court held that
because he advanced different arguments on appeal, Dunn had
failed to preserve his constitutional claims.269 Assuming,
arguendo, that Dunn had preserved his claims for appeal, the court
held that he failed to show that the statute lacked a reasonable basis
and that his equal protection claim was without merit.270 Having
rejected all constitutional claims, the court affirmed the
sentence.271
In Evans v. McTaggart,272 the supreme court held that a
third-party must meet a clear and convincing evidence standard
when applying for custody and visitation rights.273 Evans had two
children, both fathered by different men.274 The McTaggarts had
successfully filed in the trial court for custody of their biologically
related grandchild and visitation rights with Evan’s other child.275
On appeal, Evans claimed that the trial court violated her
constitutional rights as a parent by granting custody to the
McTaggarts based on a preponderance of the evidence. 276 The
supreme court held that in custody cases between parents and nonparents, the correct standard of review is the clear and convincing
262
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evidence standard.277 Evans also challenged the McTaggerts’
visitation rights to her other son, who was not biologically related
to them.278 The court held that Alaska Statutes section
25.20.060(a),279 which “permits a court to provide for visitation
based on the best interests of the child,” is constitutional if
narrowly interpreted. 280 To protect parental rights, the court held
that clear and convincing evidence should be used to determine
whether a third-party can obtain visitation rights over the parent’s
consent.281
In Larson v. Cooper,282 the supreme court held that neither
the free exercise clause of the Alaska Constitution nor the free
exercise clause of the United States Constitution protects an
inmate’s right to contact visitation with his wife.283 It also held
that restrictions on contact visitation did not violate the right to
rehabilitation nor any liberty interest in contact visits while
incarcerated.284 Larson, a maximum security prisoner at the Spring
Creek Correctional Center, sued the Director of the Division of
Institutions at the Department of Corrections and a correctional
officer claiming that his religion required kissing his wife and
holding her hand, and that the Department’s refusal to permit this
contact violated his right to exercise his religion.285 The court
held, because the rules governing prison visitation had an
incidental effect on the exercise of religion and were reasonably
related to a legitimate state interest, they were permissible under
the U.S. Constitution.286 Applying its reasoning from Frank v.
State,287 the court also concluded that the regulations did not
violate the Alaska Constitution’s free exercise clause.288
In Miller v. Safeway, Inc.,289 the supreme court held that all
of Miller’s claims failed summary judgment, but that the trial
court’s failure to allow Miller leave to amend constituted error.290
Miller, an Alaska Native, was terminated from his job at a Safeway
store because his long hair violated Safeway company policy.291
Miller originally claimed that the termination was unlawful
277
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because it violated his right to privacy and constituted
discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, and race.292 The
supreme court held that none of his claims survived summary
judgment, and affirmed the trial court in this respect.293 However,
the court held that the failure to reach a decision on the merits of
the claims in Miller’s amended complaint resulted in significant
hardship to Miller, and that litigating those claims would not
prejudice Safeway.294 The court therefore reversed and remanded
the trial court’s decision denying Miller’s motion to amend his
complaint.295
In Ruckle v. Anchorage School District,296 the supreme
court held that the mother of a student lacked citizen-taxpayer
standing with respect to claims against the school district over its
grant of school transportation contracts.297 However, the supreme
court also held that a litigant must be allowed to amend pleadings
when the litigant demonstrates valid reasons for dong so and the
allegations do not appear futile. 298 The Anchorage School District
(ASD) granted a five-year student transportation contract to First
Student in lieu of renewing with the current provider, Laidlaw
Transit.299 Laidlaw’s superior court challenge against ASD was
converted into an administrative appeal.300 Then, Ruckle, a parent
of ASD school children, also sought relief.301 Citing the absence
of Ruckle’s citizen-taxpayer standing, the superior court granted
ASD’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
refused to grant Ruckle leave to amend her complaint.302 The
supreme court agreed that Ruckle did not have standing because
under the appropriateness test,303 a more directly affected plaintiff,
Laidlaw, had already brought suit.304 However, the court held that
while Ruckle was not necessarily entitled to file an amended
complaint without seeking leave of the court,305 the superior court
erred in later refusing to grant leave to amend. Leave must be
freely given when such leave is neither motivated by bad faith nor
would result in a futile amendment.306
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In Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,307 the
supreme court upheld the constitutionality of an Alaska statute308
and an Anchorage Municipal Code ordinance309 requiring
landlords to rent to unmarried couples despite the landlords’
personal religious objections to such a practice.310 Thomas and
Baker sought a declaratory judgment enjoining enforcement of the
statute and code, arguing that the threat of sanctions and
compulsion of rental, regardless of marital status, violated their
rights of free exercise of religion and free speech.311 Although the
court found that the plaintiffs had standing and that the issue was
ripe,312 the court nonetheless held that the plaintiffs failed to meet
the standards justifying a departure from stare decisis.313
Therefore, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts that
the ordinance was the least restrictive means available.314
In Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage,315 the supreme
court upheld the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance.316
In an effort to curb juvenile crime, Anchorage enacted an
ordinance that prohibited a minor unaccompanied by a parent or
guardian from visiting a public place during specified curfew hours
unless engaged in certain exempt activities.317 Minors cited under
the ordinance challenged its constitutionality on the grounds that it
was void for vagueness and violated their right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.318 Their parents also
challenged the ordinance as impermissibly infringing on their
substantive due process right to raise their children.319
The supreme court held that the ordinance was not void for
vagueness because ordinary people could understand the terms of
the ordinance with sufficient clarity,320 and it did not allow for
undue discretion in enforcement.321 In response to the minors’
equal protection claims, the court decided to apply strict scrutiny to
the ordinance because it affected the fundamental rights to
intrastate travel, privacy, and speech.322 The court held that the
307
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ordinance survived strict scrutiny because it was the least
restrictive available means to achieve the municipality’s
compelling interest in protecting minors and curbing juvenile
crime.323 The supreme court also held that, among available
alternatives, the ordinance was the least restrictive infringement on
parents’ fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children.324
In Varilek v. City of Houston,325 the supreme court held that
the Matanuska-Susitna Borough’s administrative appeal process
violates the procedural due process rights of indigent litigants.326
Varilek claimed that the borough’s ordinances were
unconstitutional, but this claim was dismissed as unripe because he
had not exhausted his administrative remedies.327 The borough’s
administrative appeal process required a flat fee with no waiver
provision.328 The supreme court concluded that a fee without
possibility of waiver amounted to a denial of access to the legal
system.329 The court did not address Varilek’s constitutional
claims,330 and remanded his case to superior court to determine
whether Varilek met the criteria for an indigence-based claim.331
VI. CONTRACT LAW
In Imperial Manufacturing Ice Cold Coolers v. Shannon,332
the supreme court held that the Little Miller Act did not grant a
subcontractor a private right of action to sue a school district when
the school district failed to ensure that the bonding requirements of
the act were met.333 Lower Kuskokwim School District contracted
with Shannon for the construction of two buildings, though
Shannon did not provide bonds under the Act.334 Shannon
purchased supplies from Imperial and subsequently failed to
pay.335 Imperial sued the school under the Little Miller Act,
arguing the school owed Imperial a duty to ensure that Shannon
complied with the bond requirements.336 The court held that under
323
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the Little Miller Act government entities are not liable to third
parties with whom the government has no contractual
relationship.337
In Jackson v. American Equity Ins. Co.,338 the supreme
court held that a trial court may decline to give the jury a special
verdict form, where the form would allow a finding of insurer’s
breach of duty in a guarantee of payment of a judgment, were that
amount to exceed the insured’s policy limits.339 Likewise, the court
held that it was not plain error for the court to instruct the jury as to
the duties owed to an insured by the insurer, and that the insured
had failed to preserve its claim of misinstruction.340 The Jacksons’
alleged bad faith on the part of American Equity in its role as
insurer of the mechanic who installed a trailer hitch that later
malfunctioned, causing serious bodily injury to the Jacksons.341
The trial jury found for the insurer, and the Jacksons appealed,
claiming error on numerous counts, including: an improper special
verdict form, an improper admission of expert testimony, and
misinstruction of the jury.342 The court held that the proposed
special verdict form was not supported by legal authority.343 The
court further held that the instructions given to the jury did not
constitute plain error because the failure to object to the
instructions at trial was part of the Jacksons’ legal strategy.344
Finally, the court held that expert testimony was admissible, even
when it was not in the expert report, because the report provided
sufficient disclosure prior to trial and because similar evidence
offered by another witness was admitted without objection.345
In Peterson v. Ek,346 the supreme court, applying
Washington state law as required by a contract’s choice-of-law
provision, found that Peterson breached a contract to renovate and
sell a boat.347 Peterson and Ek had agreed that Ek would purchase
a boat and that Peterson would then renovate the boat for resale.348
Peterson failed to complete the renovations on schedule, used Ek’s
cell phone and credit card without her authority, and then refused
to turn over control of the vessel upon written demand.349 Peterson
argued that the trial court had failed to compensate him for the full
337
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value of his labor and had improperly awarded Ek certain costs and
expenses.350 The supreme court found that the contractual
damages were foreseeable and that the trial court did not err in
refusing to compensate Peterson for the value of his labor or
materials.351
In Still v. Cunningham,352 the supreme court held that a
woman who prevailed on a civil rights claim against a bank’s
requirement that she sign a guaranty was entitled to the full
recovery of attorney’s fees.353 In support of Vern’s business,
Premier Homes, Vern and Wanda Still signed identical guaranties
to Northrim Bank, which Vern later revoked.354 Premier defaulted
on a loan, and the loan’s assignee sued Vern and Wanda as
guarantors to collect the outstanding balance.355 Vern and Wanda
claimed the revocation precluded liability for the loan and that
their right to be free from discrimination based on marital status
was violated because Northrim required Wanda to sign a guaranty
despite Vern’s creditworthiness.356 The superior court dismissed
Vern’s claim, but held that Wanda’s guaranty was void, and
awarded her partial attorney’s fees.357 On appeal, the supreme
court upheld the finding that Vern’s guarantee applied to the loan
in question,358 and Vern had failed to preserve any defense of
mistake or misrepresentation for appeal.359 However, the supreme
court found that the trial court erred in failing to award Wanda
reasonable actual attorney’s fees.360
VII. CRIMINAL LAW
In Alvarez v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough,361 the court of
appeals held that convictions under the Borough’s leash law and
anti-molestation ordinance require a showing of at least
negligence,362 and that minor offenses are governed by the same
speedy trial requirements as other offenses.363 Alvarez was held
strictly liable for failure to properly restrain an animal and
350
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allowing an animal to run loose and bite a person.364 The court of
appeals reversed the convictions, finding the ordinances’ use of the
terms “permit” and “allow” imply some volition on the part of the
actor and that conviction requires a showing of at least
negligence.365 Alvarez also alleged that her statutory right to a
speedy trial was violated because the Borough failed bring her to
trial within 120 days after her request for a jury trial,366 as required
by Alaska Criminal Rule 45(c)(6).367 The court ruled that Rule
45(c)(2) applied to minor offenses, and therefore the time for trial
did not begin to run until Alvarez was served with the Borough’s
second complaint.368 Because trial commenced within 120 days of
the date of service, the court rejected Alvarez’s speedy trial
claim.369
In Cogdill v. State,370 the court of appeals affirmed the
lower court’s conviction of Cogdill for bootlegging in a
community that had restricted the sale and/or possession of
alcohol.371 Codgill had been caught selling alcohol in a police
sting and was convicted based on that evidence.372 Cogdill
appealed the case on the grounds that the state had refused to grant
immunity to a potential witness who had asserted her privilege
against self-incrimination.373 In affirming the conviction, the court
of appeals held that the witness’s testimony was not essential to a
fair trial, and the state had a good reason not to grant immunity to
the witness.374
In Howard v. State,375 the court of appeals held that
Howard was properly convicted of second degree forgery but was
improperly convicted of resisting arrest.376 Howard was arrested
after he provided a false name and fled from an officer during a
traffic stop for speeding.377 For the forgery claim, the trial court’s
jury instructions required the prosecution to prove that Howard
intended to defraud another individual, Russell, by signing
Russell’s name on a traffic citation.378 The appellate court found
that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence for the jury to
364
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conclude that Howard intended to defraud Russell because Howard
knew of the consequences that Russell would face as a result of his
signature appearing on the citation.379 Therefore, the conviction
for forgery was affirmed.380
The appellate court reversed Howard’s conviction for
resisting arrest because it found that he did not use “force” in
resisting arrest, as required by statute. 381 The court interpreted the
relevant statute as requiring physical contact between the arresting
officer and the defendant beyond mere noncompliance with
arrest.382 Because the arresting officer only grabbed Howard’s
jacket as Howard fled, this was not sufficient contact under the
resisting arrest statute.383 Furthermore, the statute does not apply
to situations where the defendant is merely trying to evade arrest or
hide from the officer.384
In Jackson v. State,385 the court of appeals held that the
requirement for joint operation of conduct and culpable mental
state is satisfied when the defendant’s mental state triggers the
prohibited conduct, even if the two do not occur simultaneously.386
Jackson mistakenly missed two scheduled court dates, and was
convicted on two counts of failure to appear in court.387 Jackson
argued that the joint operation requirement necessitated a finding
that his failure to appear was accompanied by a mens rea of
knowledge about the failure.388 The court of appeals upheld his
convictions, concluding that Jackson’s criminal act was
attributable to his previous culpable mental state.389
In Knutsen v. State,390 the court of appeals held that
Knutsen was liable for eight counts of indecent photography when
he hid a video camera in a women’s locker room.391 Knutsen was
convicted of two misdemeanor counts of indecent photography of
adult women and six felony counts of indecent photography of
young girls.392 Knutsen appealed, arguing that he did not have a
culpable mental state with regard to videotaping children, but only
with regard to videotaping adults.393 The court of appeals rejected
379
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this argument, holding that the fact that he did not intend to
videotape minors when he set up the camera was no defense when
his act of setting up the camera led to the taping of young girls.394
The court also rejected Knutsen’s double jeopardy argument and
concluded that Knutsen could be liable for eight criminal counts
even though he had only set up the video camera once. 395
In McGee v. State,396 the court of appeals upheld the
defendant’s conviction rejected the claim of self-defense because
there was no evidence that he faced imminent injury.397 McGee
was convicted of third-degree criminal mischief for breaking the
windows of a truck belonging to Alexander.398 McGee claimed
that he did so to prevent Alexander from running him over with the
truck.399 The court of appeals found no evidence in the record to
suggest the threat of harm was imminent, and therefore, the claim
of self-defense failed.400 In addition, based on its assessment of
the trial record, the court of appeals upheld the sentencing judge’s
rejection of mitigating factors and imposition of an enhanced
sentence for committing an offense while on felony probation.401
In Ridlington v. State,402 the court of appeals held that
double jeopardy did not bar the state from prosecuting a defendant
for felony Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) even though the
defendant has already plead guilty to a misdemeanor DWI charge
stemming from the same conduct.403 Ridlington was initially
charged with a misdemeanor DWI and later charged with a felony
DWI when police discovered that he had two prior DWI
convictions.404 Ridlington pled guilty to the misdemeanor, but the
superior court dismissed the misdemeanor charge and indicted him
for felony DWI.405 The court of appeals held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the state from prosecuting
greater pending offenses when the defendant has pled guilty to
lesser included offenses, especially when only one trial was
contemplated by the state.406
In Robart v. State,407 the court of appeals affirmed Robart’s
conviction for using the state seal for commercial purposes without
394
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permission.408 Robart argued on appeal that federal copyright law
preempted the state seal protection statute and, alternatively, that
the jury instructions provided by the trial court had not adequately
explained his defense.409 The court of appeals found that federal
copyright law did not preempt the state statute because state seals
were more similar to trademarks than they were to the types of
works covered by copyright law.410 The court of appeals also
found that the jury instructions adequately explained a “mistake of
fact” defense.411 Thus, the court of appeals upheld Robart’s
conviction under the state seal protection statute.412
In Robbins v. State,413 the court of appeals affirmed a
probation condition that required the defendant to pay 40% of his
net income for the support of his family.414 Robbins plead guilty
to one count of attempted first-degree abuse of a minor for
sexually abusing his eleven-year old daughter.415 Subsequent
sentencing resulted in an eight year term with three years
suspended and probation conditions including a requirement that
Robbins send up to 40% of his net income to support his family.416
In rejecting Robbins’s argument that said probation condition was
not reasonably related to the protection of the public or his
rehabilitation, the court explained that a judge may consider a
defendant’s financial support of his family as part of the
defendant’s rehabilitation.417 Thus, the court held that the trial
court’s conclusion that Robbins’s rehabilitation would benefit by
imposing such financial conditions was reasonable.418
In State v. Yi,419 the court of appeals held that an
unreasonable belief in the legality of a transaction would not
suffice to establish the defense of entrapment.420 Yi illegally
traded alcohol for a bear gall bladder to an undercover state
trooper.421 At trial, Yi raised the defense of entrapment and
claimed that the trooper suggested structuring the deal as a trade
rather than a sale.422 The court of appeals rejected the defense,
noting that both the sale of alcohol and the sale of bear gall
408
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bladders are illegal and merely restructuring the two transactions
as one would not make the trade legal.423 Therefore, Yi’s reliance
on the officer’s suggestion was unreasonable and insufficient to
establish entrapment.424
In Timothy v. Alaska,425 the court of appeals held that the
legal definition of “burglary” does not include a motor vehicle not
“adapted for overnight accommodation,” and thus an Illinois
burglary conviction that included all motor vehicles was too broad
to be used for sentence enhancement.426 Timothy was convicted of
assault and his sentence was enhanced based on three prior
convictions in Illinois.427 Timothy argued that the Alaska
definition of burglary is narrower than the definition of burglary in
Illinois and that presumptive sentencing must be based on prior
convictions which are similar under both Alaska law and the law
of the convicting state.428 The court found that Timothy’s prior
convictions did not qualify for presumptive sentencing because
only vehicles adapted for overnight accommodation fit the
definition of “building.”429 The court vacated the sentence and
remanded the case.430
In Wells v. State,431 the court of appeals held the statutory
definition of “medical treatment” received by a child for injuries
sustained was unclear and therefore reversed the petitioner’s third
degree assault conviction.432 Wells was caring for his girlfriend’s
nine-month-old child when the child sustained several bruises to
the head.433 Over Wells’s objections, the child was taken to the
hospital where several tests were performed to check for internal
injuries but the child was deemed stable enough no to be
admitted.434 In order to commit third degree assault a person
eighteen years of age or older must recklessly cause physical injury
to a child under ten which requires medical treatment.435 Wells
claimed that since the child’s injuries healed on their own the care
received by the child did not constitute medical treatment.436 The
court held that the statutory definition of medical treatment was
unclear, and therefore, the statute must be construed against the
423
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government.437 Accordingly, the court found that the child’s
medical care did not constitute medical treatment and reversed
Wells’s conviction for third degree assault.438
VIII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE
In Adams v. State,439 the court of appeals held that a police
officer’s pat-down search was not warranted when there was no
imminent public danger or likelihood that serious harm to persons
or property had recently occurred, and that evidence obtained
during that search was inadmissible.440 During an investigative
stop, a police officer conducted a pat-down search of Adams, a
passenger in a car, and found cocaine in Adams’s possession.441
The trial court held that the officer was entitled to conduct the patdown search and denied Adams’s motion to suppress the
evidence.442 Following the Coleman v. State443 standard, the court
held that the officer was not authorized to conduct a pat-down
search because he did not have information that would lead a
reasonable officer to believe that there was imminent public danger
or the recent occurrence of serious harm to persons or property.444
In Albers v. State,445 the court of appeals held that a police
officer was justified in ordering a suspect to open his hand during a
drug-related investigative stop because the officer reasonably
believed that the suspect was holding an object that could be used
as a weapon.446 Albers sought to exclude drug evidence that the
officer found in his clenched hand, arguing that the officer had no
reason to believe that he was armed.447 The court held that the
officer’s search was reasonable in light of the fact that persons
suspected of a felony drug offense are likely to carry small
weapons and engage in violence when confronted by police.448
In Anderson v. State,449 the court of appeals affirmed a
conviction for misconduct involving a controlled substance despite
an illegal search due to the fact that the contraband discovery was
437
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inevitable.450 Anderson was arrested on an outstanding warrant
with a pre-set bail.451 When he arrived at the police station, an
officer conducted a pre-incarceration inventory of Anderson’s
pockets without first asking if he could post bail.452 The search
revealed trace amounts of methamphetamine.453 The court of
appeals held that this search was impermissible because the State
could not demonstrate any exigency that would necessitate
conducting the search before providing Anderson with an
opportunity to raise bail.454 Nonetheless, the court affirmed
Anderson’s conviction because the methamphetamine would have
been discovered through predictable investigative processes.455
In Brodigan v. State,456 the court of appeals held that the
district court could impose a mandatory minimum sentence based
on the defendant’s prior convictions when the defendant failed to
provide evidence that these convictions were based on an
unconstitutionally vague regulation.457 Brodigan was convicted of
misdemeanor Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) and faced an
enhanced sentence of 360 days imprisonment because of six prior
DWIs.458 Brodigan argued that the court should presume that his
prior convictions were invalid because a clause in the regulation
under which he was convicted was later held to be
unconstitutionally vague.459 The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that a defendant carries the burden of producing some
evidence of a constitutional flaw in a prior conviction460 Here
Brodigan did not produce any evidence to show that his
convictions were among the small number of DWI convictions
struck down for vagueness under the regulation.461 The district
court, therefore, properly relied on Brodigan’s prior convictions in
imposing a mandatory minimum sentence.462
In City of Kodiak v. Samaniego,463 the supreme court held
that exigent circumstances must be present for police to detain a
witness to a crime464 and affirmed the lower courts’ decisions to
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refuse proposed jury instructions465 and to exclude certain
evidence.466 Kodiak Police Sergeant Marsh detained Julia
Samaniego and her daughter, Marsha, as potential witnesses.467
The superior court denied Kodiak’s motion for summary judgment,
refused to give Kodiak’s jury instructions, and excluded two items
of Kodiak’s evidence, expert testimony and a pocket knife.468 A
jury found that Marsh falsely confined and committed battery
against Marsha.469 Kodiak appealed the superior court’s denial of
summary judgment, claiming that Marsh reasonably believed
exigent circumstances justified stopping Martha, and in the
alternative, that exigent circumstances should not be required for
an officer to detain witnesses at the scene of a traffic stop.470
Kodiak also appealed the superior court’s refusal to give requested
jury instructions, exclusion of the knife and the expert, and
adjustment of Martha’s award of attorney’s fees.471 The supreme
court held that exigent circumstances are necessary to justify
detention of a witness to a crime.472 The court upheld rulings of
the superior court.473
In Cleveland v. State,474 the court of appeals rejected
Cleveland’s argument that the trial court improperly excluded
evidence tending to show that the crimes of second-degree sexual
assault and second-degree assault were committed by someone
else.475 The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to admit hearsay and certain
physical evidence offered by the defendant because such
exclusions were not based on a determination that the evidence
was offered for an improper purpose, but rather were soundly
excluded based on the Alaska Rules of Evidence.476 Further, no
exception to the hearsay rules was available based on Cleveland’s
defense that another may have committed the crime because the
evidence sought to be admitted was that of a mere motive or
character and failed to directly connect another party with the
actual commission of the crime.477 The court also upheld
sentencing for a term greater than the normal ten year ceiling based
on Cleveland’s two prior felony convictions, his conviction history
465
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for criminal assaults, and because substantial aggravating factors
existed to support a greater sentence.478
In Crawford v. Drvenkar,479 the supreme court held that
police officers conducted a legal search of plaintiff Crawford’s car
and were immune from common law claims.480 A police officer
pulled Crawford over for a traffic violation and asked for his driver
registration.481 When Crawford retrieved the registration from his
glove compartment, the officer believed he spotted a metallic
object resembling a handgun.482 A search revealed that the metal
object was a vice grips, not a handgun.483 Crawford sued the
officers for monetary damages and argued that his right to be free
of unreasonable searches under the state and federal constitutions
had been violated.484 In light of Crawford’s admission that the patdown search was reasonable, the court held that the search was not
unreasonable.485 The court also held that qualified immunity
protects the police officers from § 1983 claims because it was
reasonable to believe that this search was lawful.486
In Crawford v. State,487 the court of appeals upheld the
search of a vehicle’s console during a traffic stop when the police
officer conducting the stop reasonably believed the console
contained a concealed weapon.488 Crawford was stopped by a
police officer who observed him driving erratically, then
“fidgeting” in the driver’s seat as if moving an object.489 The
officer arrested Crawford for reckless driving, and then opened the
center console expecting to find a weapon.490 Instead, the officer
found crack cocaine and paraphernalia, which served as evidence
toward Crawford’s conviction for misconduct involving a
controlled substance.491 The court of appeals held that the search
was justified as incident to arrest and the officer had an articulable
and reasonable basis to conclude that the console contained a
weapon.492
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In Custer v. State,493 the court of appeals held that the
composite jail time for multiple offenses is the relevant factor in
reviewing the length of a sentence.494 Custer was convicted on two
assault counts, and sentenced to five years imprisonment with four
years suspended in each case.495 After multiple probation
violations, the superior court revoked Custer’s probation and
imposed the remaining 38 months on one count and three months
on the other.496 Custer appealed the 38-month sentence, arguing
that it violated sentencing rules and was mistakenly severe.497 The
court of appeals upheld the long sentence because it was part of a
composite and the combined time was justified by Custer’s
repeated probation violations.498 The court concluded that Custer’s
composite sentence was not mistakenly severe given his criminal
history, his two felony convictions, and his probation violations.499
In Dayton v. State,500 the court of appeals affirmed a
superior court ruling admitting DNA profile evidence in a sexual
assault case.501 Dayton argued that expert testimony was
inadmissible under Alaska Evidence Rule 703 because the state
failed to establish reliability of the Athabascan DNA database on
which the expert relied.502 The superior court determined that the
database was reliable under Rule 703 because it constituted the
type of data that DNA experts rely upon and because it was
described in a peer-reviewed publication.503 The court of appeals
held that the superior court’s finding that the database was reliable
was supported by substantial evidence.504
In Frank v. State,505 the court of appeals held that the
Alaska Parole Board did not provide an adequate basis for its
denial of a prison inmate’s application for discretionary parole.506
After serving twenty years of a life sentence, Frank was denied
discretionary parole and told that he could reapply only after
serving an additional ten years.507 The court held that pursuant to
statutory law the Board must provide sufficient details in a denial
of parole such that an inmate can guide his future behavior and
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prepare for a more successful future application.508 Further,
sufficient detail is necessary because a reviewing court must be
able to determine whether parole was denied for an impermissible
reason.509 The court ordered the Board to reissue a revised
decision because it failed to sufficiently describe the deficiencies
of Frank’s release plan.510
In Goldsbury v. State,511 the court of appeals held that the
superior court committed a procedural error by failing to require
the defendant’s attorney to give a detailed explanation of why he
believed his client had no arguable claims for post-conviction
relief.512 Goldsbury’s court-appointed counsel filed a certificate
conceding that his client had no arguable claim for post-conviction
relief.513 The court of appeals held that a certificate filed pursuant
to Alaska Criminal Rule 35.1(e)(2)(B) must contain sufficient
detail to allow the superior court to independently assess whether
the defendant has any potential claims for post-conviction relief.514
The court held that Goldsbury’s attorney failed to meet this
standard because the certificate was conclusory and lacked
sufficient factual detail.515 Therefore, the superior court did not
fulfill its obligation to independently assess the potential merit of
Goldsbury’s claims under Alaska.516
In Gross v. State,517 the court of appeals held that the
superior court’s exclusion of testimony offered as character
evidence constituted harmless error.518 At trial, Gross attempted to
call a character witness, but the court ruled that the evidence would
be inadmissible unless Gross testified as well.519 Gross testified
and did not further contest the issue.520 The court of appeals held
that the evidence was admissible even if Gross did not testify.521
However, the error was harmless because Gross did not contend
that the ruling affected his decision to testify.522
In Guerre-Chaley v. State,523 the court of appeals held that
an expert opinion based on scientific evidence is not admissible
508
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under Alaska Evidence Rule 703 unless the underlying evidence
meets the Daubert-Coon test.524 Guerre-Chaley was charged with
driving while intoxicated.525 At trial, the judge excluded the
results of a preliminary breath test because the defense did not
present evidence to establish that the test satisfied the DaubertCoon standard of scientific validity.526 On appeal, Guerre-Chaley
argued that the results of the breath test were admissible under
Rule 703, which permits an expert witness to base an opinion on
otherwise inadmissible scientific evidence as long as other experts
reasonably rely on such evidence.527 The court of appeals
disagreed, holding that Rule 703 requires that data underlying a
scientific conclusion also must meet the Daubert-Coon test for
admissibility.528
In Herrin v. State,529 the court of appeals held that the
superior court is not required to order explicitly the tolling of a
defendant’s probation when the judge orally pronounces a
defendant’s sentence.530 Herrin was serving a prison sentence for
first-degree stalking and assault against his then-wife.531 Shortly
before he was released on parole, he wrote threatening letters to
her.532 Herrin was indicted for first-degree stalking and the state
petitioned the superior court to revoke his probation.533 The
superior court revoked Herrin’s prior probation date and extended
the probation period by the length of time the petition was
pending.534 Herrin argued that the court erred because the judge
did not orally order revocation of his probation; however, while an
oral proclamation controls when there is a discrepancy between the
written judgment and the oral sentence in discretionary matters,
this rule does not apply to non-discretionary matters set by
statute.535 Here the disputed issue was covered by statute,
therefore it was inconsequential that the judge did not orally
revoke Herrin’s probation sentencing.536
In Hertz v. State,537 the court of appeals held that it did not
have jurisdiction to consider a post-conviction petition from a state
prisoner alleging improper and unconstitutional treatment by the
524
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Alaska Department of Corrections.538 Hertz, an inmate convicted
of second-degree murder, claimed that he was denied adequate
legal assistance and medical care in prison and was subject to
retaliation by the Department of Corrections after filing a petition
for post-conviction relief.539 The court of appeals noted that state
law provides that procedural matters related to conviction and
sentencing be brought before that court.540 However, the state
supreme court was the proper venue for raising prison condition
and disciplinary claims.541 Therefore, the court of appeals
dismissed Hertz’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.542
In James v. State,543 the supreme court held that the trial
court improperly failed to consider whether a recantation by the
key prosecution witness would have resulted in James’ acquittal in
a new trial.544 James had been convicted of sexual assault and
sexual abuse of a minor, largely on the strength of the testimony of
Danielle M., a fourteen year-old girl claiming to have seen the
assault.545 When Danielle later recanted her testimony in an
affidavit, James appealed for a new trial.546 After an evidentiary
hearing, the trial court found that the recantation was not
credible.547 James appealed, arguing the court had erred in basing
its denial entirely upon the credibility of the recantation.548 The
supreme court agreed, holding that the proper standard required the
trial court to consider whether the recantation, in addition to all
other evidence, would likely result in an acquittal at a new trial.549
In Jeffries v. State,550 the court of appeals found no error in
the admission of evidence of Jeffries’ prior bad acts, and that there
was a sufficient showing of the defendant’s mental state for the
jury to convict him of second-degree murder.551 Driving while
intoxicated, Jeffries turned in front of another vehicle, and his
passenger died in the ensuing collision.552 Jeffries was convicted
of second-degree murder, which requires a reckless state of mind
demonstrating “an extreme indifference to the value of human
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life.”553 The State introduced evidence to establish “extreme
indifference,” including facts related to Jeffries’ recidivism and
consumption of alcohol in violation of his probation on the date of
the accident.554 Jeffries argued that there was insufficient evidence
to support his conviction because his mental state should only be
inferred from his actions while driving and his only demonstrated
driving error was a left turn into an oncoming vehicle.555 The
court evaluated the difference between manslaughter and seconddegree murder, and concluded the question for the jury was
whether the defendant’s “level of awareness of the risk” was equal
to or greater than “recklessness” as defined by the statute.556 The
court held that the jury was entitled to consider the evidence
submitted by the State to evaluate whether or not Jeffries acted
with such extreme recklessness to warrant a murder conviction.557
Consequently, evidence admitted to show the degree of the
defendant’s recklessness was not unfairly prejudicial, and Jeffries’
conviction was affirmed.558
In Johnson v. State,559 the court of appeals held that
evidence of cocaine possession was admissible when discovered
during a search incident to arrest for a “minor on licensed
premises” violation.560 A city police officer arrested Johnson for
being in a bar and underage alcohol consumption.561 Patting down
Johnson’s pockets, the officer found four small bags of cocaine.562
Johnson moved to suppress this evidence as beyond the scope of a
search for weapons or for evidence related to crimes for which the
police have probable cause to arrest. 563 The court of appeals
upheld the search because evidence supporting a “minor on
licensed premises” charge could be concealed on an individual’s
person.564
In Keller v. State,565 the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court’s denial of Keller’s motion to dismiss because the delay in
bringing Keller to trial was for good cause.566 Charges against
Keller alleging that he drove intoxicated were originally filed in
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the Bethel district court.567 However, the case was ultimately
assigned to a judge in Fairbanks after three judges recused
themselves due to their professional relationship with Keller’s
father, the local bailiff.568 As a result of the delay caused by the
recusals and reassignments, Keller was not brought to trial within
the 120 days required.569 Judges have a duty to recuse themselves
not only when they cannot be fair and unbiased but also when a
reasonable person may question their impartiality.570 The court of
appeals held that the four-day delay in this case was excused
because it was for good cause.571
In Landt v. State,572 the court of appeals held that a trial
court judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing jurors to pose
questions to witnesses in a criminal trial.573 Landt was convicted
of driving while intoxicated and tampering with evidence, but
acquitted of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.574
At trial, the judge allowed the jury to submit questions for
witnesses.575 The jury presented fifty-two questions, of which the
judge put forth forty-two to the witnesses.576 The court of appeals
determined that the judge had avoided compromising the jury’s
impartiality by reviewing the submitted questions with counsel for
both parties outside the jury’s presence.577
In Larkin v. State,578 the court of appeals held that a defect
in form in the indictment was not grounds for reversing a jury
verdict as long as it did not prejudice the ability of the defendant to
prepare or present a defense.579 Larkin was convicted for seconddegree sexual abuse of a minor.580 On appeal, Larkin argued that
because the date specified in the indictment was not the same date
shown by the evidence, he could not be convicted as a matter of
law.581 Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals concluded
that the allegation of date is not an element of a crime unless made
material by the statute defining the offense.582 The outcome of a
trial cannot be affected by a defect of form in the indictment unless
567
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it can be shown that the defect prejudiced the substantial rights of
the defendant.583
In MacDonald v. State,584 the court of appeals dismissed a
petition for post-conviction relief.585 MacDonald was convicted of
second degree escape after he fled from police.586 In his appeal for
post-conviction relief, MacDonald asserted that his trial attorney
was incompetent for failing to argue that his conduct did not
constitute second-degree escape, because the police had not yet
arrested him but merely touched him.587 The court of appeals held,
however, that an arrest is complete if the arrestee is touched by an
officer, even if the officer “does not succeed in stopping or holding
[him] even for an instant.”588 The court of appeals affirmed the
lower court’s dismissal of MacDonald’s petition for postconviction relief because he was under arrest, according to the
common law definition, at the time he escaped.589
In Nason v. State,590 the court of appeals held that the trial
court judge erred by allowing Nason to be shackled in front of a
jury without a hearing to determine whether restraints were
necessary.591 Nason was convicted of first degree assault and third
degree weapon misconduct.592 At trial, Nason’s wrists and ankles
were shackled.593 Nason’s attorney objected to the shackles, but
the trial court judge refused to hold a hearing on the necessity of
the restraints.594 On appeal, the court of appeals held that the judge
erred by failing to hold a hearing, but remanded to the trial court to
determine whether Nason was prejudiced by the error.595 Also on
appeal, Nason argued that the police did not have valid consent to
search the cabin in which he was found.596 The court of appeals
held that the victim of the assault, who was the owner of the cabin,
had given valid consent.597
In Parker v. State,598 the court of appeals denied Parker’s
request that the court reconsider allowing him to withdraw his plea
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bargain agreement.599 Parker was indicted for unlawful
exploitation of a minor, possession of child pornography, third
degree controlled substance abuse, interference with official
proceedings and three counts of first-degree controlled substance
abuse.600 Parker initially pleaded no contest to the three felonies in
a plea bargain with the state, but later tried to withdraw his
pleas.601 Parker sought to withdraw his plea on the ground that he
had misunderstood the strategic consequences of losing a
suppression motion.602 The court of appeals rejected this petition
because nothing in the record supported his contention.603
However, the court did find that Parker had successfully offered
mitigating evidence for two of his crimes and remanded the case to
the lower court for resentencing.604
In Powell v. State,605 the court of appeals held that a
consecutive sentence imposed for multiple violations of the same
offense may exceed the maximum allowable sentence for a single
offense if the defendant poses a danger to the public safety and
previous attempts at rehabilitation have failed.606 Powell was
convicted of two counts of first-degree assault, one count of
reckless endangerment, and one count of driving while intoxicated
in connection with a vehicular accident in which four persons were
injured.607 Citing Powell’s criminal history,608 the trial judge
sentenced him to 26 years in prison.609 Powell argued on appeal
that the sentence was too harsh because it exceeded the twentyyear maximum for first-degree assault and was longer than any
sentence imposed for vehicular manslaughter.610 The court of
appeals upheld the consecutive sentence, finding it justified by
Powell’s extensive criminal history.611
In Reichel v. State,612 the court of appeals held that an
investigative stop of a parolee was improper because there was no
evidence indicating that the parolee’s conduct posed an imminent

599

Id. at 199.
Id. at 196.
601
Id. at 195.
602
Id.
603
Id. at 199.
604
Id. at 200.
605
88 P.3d 532 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
606
Id. at 539.
607
Id. at 533.
608
Id. at 536. This history included three prior felony convictions, eleven
convictions for driving while intoxicated, eight convictions for driving on a
suspended license, and numerous other misdemeanors. Id. at 534.
609
Id. at 538.
610
Id. at 533.
611
Id. at 539.
612
101 P.3d 197 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
600

43

danger to public safety.613 Reichel, on parole following a DWI
conviction, was observed by police officers as he violated the
terms of his parole, which prohibited him from either consuming
alcohol or being on premises where alcoholic beverages are
sold.614 After stopping Reichel and contacting his parole officer,
the police officers searched Reichel and found cocaine in his
pocket.615 The trial court denied Reichel’s motion to suppress the
cocaine evidence during a trial for controlled substances
misconduct.616 Without evidence that Reichel posed an imminent
threat to public safety by driving while intoxicated, the court of
appeals held that the investigative stop was not authorized and that
the suppression of evidence motion should have been granted.617
In Riggins v. State,618 the court of appeals held that the
superior court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence that
a criminal defendant accused of assaulting his girlfriend had
committed prior assaults against a different girlfriend.619 After
admitting evidence that Riggins had previously committed assaults
on a prior girlfriend, the lower court convicted Riggins of assault
in the second degree for striking his girlfriend in the face with a
dangerous instrument.620 The court of appeals held that although
the evidence did suggest defendant's character to become violent,
the state had more relevant evidence to establish this character
trait, including defendant's prior assaults on his current
girlfriend.621 Additionally, the danger of unfair prejudice from
admitting the evidence of these assaults outweighed its
probativity.622 Therefore, the court could not find that admission
of the evidence constituted harmless error and reversed Riggins’s
conviction.623
In Ritter v. State,624 the court of appeals held that a crime
for which the defendant was separately convicted and sentenced
could not serve as an aggravating factor in determining the
sentence for another crime.625 Ritter, a massage therapist, was
indicted for sexually assaulting three of his clients and pled no
contest to a single count of second-degree assault.626 After
613
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sentencing, Ritter challenged his plea and it was set aside.627 Ritter
was then convicted at trial for the three original counts and an
additional count that occurred while he was out on bail.628 The
court of appeals upheld the four convictions concluding there was
sufficient evidence that Ritter’s sexual contact was made without
consent.629 Ritter also appealed his sentence on four different
theories. First, he claimed that it violated his right to due process
because it was greater than the sentence he initially received under
his plea bargain.630 The court rejected this argument because
Ritter chose to challenge and set aside his plea.631 Second, Ritter
claimed his sentence was excessive because it was greater than the
presumptive term for a second time offender.632 Although Ritter
was a first time offender, the court held that the judge had good
reason for exceeding the presumptive term considering the nature
of Ritter’s four counts.633 Third, Ritter challenged the conclusion
that his crime was “aggravated” because his victims were
particularly vulnerable.634 The court held that his victims were
vulnerable due to the therapist-patient relationship.635 Fourth,
Ritter argued that the judge erred in finding his conduct was
aggravated because of repeated sexual assaults.636 The court
agreed and held that Ritter’s separate conviction could not be
double counted as an aggravating fact.637 As a result, the court
remanded for consideration of a new sentence without this
aggravator.638
In Sipary v. State,639 the court of appeals affirmed Sipary’s
conviction, rejecting the application of both the common law and
evidentiary “rule of completeness” and the “excited utterance”
hearsay exception.640 The State charged Sipary with first-degree
assault, on the theory that he initially injured the victim in selfdefense but then went well beyond the bounds of self-defense
when he continued to beat the victim to exact retribution for an
earlier incident.641 To prove its case, the State introduced various
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witness statements.642 Sipary argued that the State introduced
partial statements that violated the common law rule of
completeness as well as the Alaska Rules of Evidence by taking
these selected portions out of context.643 In finding that the
relevant rule does not give a party an absolute right to introduce
omitted portions of a statement except where relevant and
necessary to a proper understanding of previously admitted
portions, 644 the court held that the rule of completeness was
inapplicable because Sipary’s counsel did not preserve the issue
for appeal by objecting in a timely manner to the select
testimony.645 Further, the court rejected the defendant’s argument
that certain out-of-court statements should have been admissible
under the “excited utterance” exception of Alaska Evidence Rule
803(2),646 because defense counsel failed to make a proper offer of
proof and such statements did not appear to be made in a sufficient
state of excitement to justify waiving reliability concerns.647
Therefore, the court upheld Sipary’s conviction.648
In Smith v. State,649 the court of appeals held that an
anonymous phone call can give a police officer reasonable
suspicion to pull over a potentially intoxicated driver.650 Smith
was arrested for driving while intoxicated, following an
anonymous call to the police.651 Smith argued that evidence from
his DWI stop should have been suppressed because the police stop
was not supported by reasonable suspicion of driving while
intoxicated.652 The court of appeals held that an anonymous call
gave police reasonable suspicion that a driver was intoxicated,
reasoning such a phone call would probably come from a person
that observed the offender.653 Smith also argued that his prior
DWIs from Arkansas were improperly considered in deeming him
a second felony offender, given differences in Arkansas and
Alaska DWI laws.654 The court held that Alaska DWI laws
governed in determining whether the dates of Smith’s previous
DWIs were sufficiently recent for him to be considered a second
felony offender.655 The court held that Smith should have been
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sentenced as a first-time felony offender. The court reasoned that
the district court should have considered whether or not Smith
would have been a first or second-time felony offender, if the
Arkansas DWIs had occurred in Alaska.656
In Sheridan v. Municipality of Anchorage,657 the court of
appeals held that the defendant’s prior convictions could be
considered in determining his mandatory minimum sentence for
driving while intoxicated.658 Sheridan was previously convicted
for driving while intoxicated under a now invalid Anchorage
ordinance.659 Because Sheridan did not explain in his briefing why
the invalidity of a similar state statute rendered his prior
convictions invalid, the court held that the briefing was inadequate
and constituted a waiver of his claim.660 In addition, the court held
that, even if Sheridan had adequately briefed his argument, it
would still have failed because he could not present evidence to
show that he was previously convicted under the allegedly invalid
provision of the ordinance.661
In State v. Andrews,662 the court of appeals held that the use
of Loran C readings without their corresponding printouts to show
a violation of commercial fishing laws in a criminal trial was not a
due process violation.663 Andrews was charged with fishing in
closed waters after Fish and Wildlife Protection troopers had used
Loran C technology to determine the location of his fishing
vessel.664 Andrews moved to exclude this evidence because the
troopers failed to preserve a record of the readings and because the
state failed to demonstrate that the troopers were adequately
trained to use Loran C technology.665 The court of appeals
affirmed the admissibility of such evidence, holding that the state
was not required to maintain a record of Loran C readings because
commercial fishers had the ability to independently obtain Loran C
readings from equipment on their own fishing vessels.666 In
addition, the court held that there was evidence that the troopers
were sufficiently qualified to use Loran C technology, despite the
fact that the state had no formal training procedures.667
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In State v. Blank,668 the supreme court held that a
warrantless breath test of a driver is potentially valid under Alaska
law when exigent circumstances exist. Blank fatally struck a
pedestrian while driving home and failed to stop.669 The
investigating officer obtained a warrantless breath test after being
told by Blank that she had consumed alcohol prior to driving home
that night.670 The court of appeals reversed Blank’s convictions,
holding that Alaska Statutes section 28.35.031(g) violated federal
and state constitutional protections against unlawful searches and
seizures. The court of appeals reasoned that exigent circumstances
could not exist where Blank had not been placed under arrest
before or substantially contemporaneously with the breath test.671
The supreme court reversed, holding that the warrantless search of
Blank’s breath may have been a valid and constitutional exigent
circumstance.672 In reversing, the court expressly overruled the
requirement from Layland v. State673 that justification of exigent
circumstances requires a prior or substantially contemporaneous
arrest.674 Therefore, the court remanded for further factual
determinations of whether exigent circumstances did exist.675
In State v. Crocker,676 the court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal of charges and the suppression of evidence from an
illegal search of the defendant’s home.677 Crocker was indicted for
fourth-degree controlled substance misconduct after police “found
marijuana plants, harvested marijuana, and marijuana-growing
equipment.”678 However, in order to obtain a search warrant to
gather evidence of marijuana possession, the state must establish
the limits that are constitutionally protected under Ravin v. State,679
and Noy v. State680.681 The court affirmed the superior court’s
ruling that such probable cause was not established and thus all
evidence obtained from that search warrant must be suppressed.682
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In State v. Semancik,683 the supreme court overruled Adkins
v. State,684 a prior decision that permitted a defendant to challenge
a burglary indictment for the first time on appeal.685 After
Semancik was convicted of attempted burglary in the first degree,
he successfully challenged the indictment on the grounds that it did
not specify the crime that he intended to commit in the dwelling.686
On the State’s appeal, the supreme court affirmed part of its prior
holding in Adkins by continuing to require the State to specify a
defendant’s intended crime in a burglary indictment.687 However,
the court overruled the Adkins holding that a failure to include the
intended crime is a substantive defect.688 Rather, the court found
this defect to be one of form that cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.689 Thus, the court reinstated Semancik’s conviction
because its decision was applied retroactively and his rights were
not prejudiced by the defective indictment.690
In Valencia v. State,691 the court of appeals held that credit
for good behavior could only be earned by prisoners serving
sentences in correctional facilities and could not be earned by
residents of a court-ordered alcohol rehabilitation center.692 Upon
revocation of his parole, Valencia was sentenced to prison and
awarded credit against his sentence for 437 days spent in a courtordered alcohol rehabilitation center.693 Valencia argued that he
should be awarded an additional 146 days of “good time” credit,
equivalent to what he would have received had he served an
equivalent period of time in prison.694 Valencia appealed the
superior court’s refusal to award the additional credit.695 The court
affirmed, holding that a state statute696 restricted such “good time”
credit to prisoners in correctional facilities.697 The court reasoned
that inmates in rehabilitation programs, for whom misbehavior
results in return to prison, already have incentive for good
behavior.698
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In Way v. State,699 the court of appeals held that a state
trooper had probable cause to stop a vehicle for having an illegible
license plate.700 Way challenged the stop of his vehicle as
pretextual, based on the trooper’s suspicion that Way was using his
vehicle as a methamphetamine lab.701 The court held that the
trooper had probable cause to stop the vehicle because the license
plate was not clearly legible.702 Because the stop was based on a
legitimate law enforcement objective, the court did not address the
constitutionality of pretext traffic stops.703
In Way v. State,704 the court of appeals held that, under
certain circumstances during a search, police have the authority to
restrain and frisk occupants of a building.705 Way was restrained in
a private home while the police executed a search for an escaped
fugitive.706 Based on the police’s prior knowledge of the
defendant, Way was singled out for “special questioning” and was
frisked.707 During the frisk, the police found drug paraphernalia,
and Way was arrested for “fourth-degree controlled substance
misconduct.”708 He appealed, claiming that the methods the police
used to discover the drug paraphernalia were illegal.709
Specifically, Way argued that “the officers had no authority to
detain him at the scene, handcuff him, and subject him to
questioning.”710 Relying primarily on the United State Supreme
Court’s decision in Michigan v. Summers,711 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that temporarily restraining the occupants while
executing the search was reasonable.712 However, absent the
necessary prerequisite “suspicion of criminal activity,” the
continued detention of Way beyond the completion of the search
was unjustified.713 Furthermore, the court held that police are not
authorized to frisk individuals who are present, but are apparently
unconnected to the crime, during a search unless there is “some
additional affirmative indication” that the individuals are “armed
and presently dangerous.”714 In this case, the police’s prior
699
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knowledge of Way in relation to drug use and weapon possession
justified the frisk.715
In Whitesides v. State,716 the court of appeals held that a
buyer’s fatal overdose was not an aggravating factor in the
sentencing of a defendant convicted of selling a controlled
substance.717 Whitesides was arrested and charged with seconddegree substance misconduct for selling heroin to a user who
overdosed and died.718 The sentencing judge added two-and-a-half
suspended years to Whitesides’s sentence after finding an
aggravating factor: that a person, other than an accomplice,
sustained physical injury as a direct result of Whitesides’s
conduct.719 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the term
“direct result” signaled the legislature’s intent to require a closer
connection between cause and effect than would be required to
establish proximate cause.720 Recognizing that Whitesides’s
conduct was egregious, however, the court of appeals remanded
the case with specific authorization to consider the applicability of
another aggravating factor.721
In Wholecheese v. State,722 the supreme court held that the
refusal of a defendant’s request for a specific venue was within the
trial court’s discretion.723 Wholecheese was indicted on several
felony charges in Galena.724 Wholecheese moved to have the
venue changed from Fairbanks to Galena, which was not an
approved felony venue.725 The superior court held the trial would
be held in Nenana.726 The supreme court held Wholecheese did
not meet his burden to show the jury pool in Nanana was
insufficient and the trial judge did not abuse her discretion.727
IX. EMPLOYMENT LAW
In Barry v. University of Alaska,728 the supreme court held
that a pre-retirement release did not bar an employee’s claim for
enforcement of a promise to be performed after the release was
715
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executed.729 Barry negotiated an agreement with the University of
Alaska, his employer, in which the university agreed to give Barry
credit for twenty years of service in order for Barry to secure
certain benefits from a newly implemented retirement incentive
program.730 In exchange, Barry signed a document releasing the
university from any future claims related to his employment.731
When his first benefit check did not reflect the terms of this
agreement, Barry sued the university.732 The superior court
granted summary judgment for the university, holding that the
release barred the litigation.733 The supreme court reversed
because the promise by the university to credit Barry with twenty
years of service had to be performed after the release was
signed.734 The supreme court held that summary judgment was
erroneously granted because no reasonable person in Barry’s
position would believe that the release barred a suit for breach of
contract that occurred after the release was executed.735
In Bd. of Trade Inc., v. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour
Administration,736 the supreme court held that a hearing officer had
improperly relied on an overly narrow test to determine that a
location was “on-site” for the purposes of the Little Davis-Bacon
Act (“Act”).737 Board of Trade, Inc. argued that the Camp Nome
Quarry was not “on-site” for the purposes of the Act and that it
was therefore not obligated to pay the prevailing wage for work
performed at the location.738 The supreme court reiterated that the
hearing officer should have considered the following in making his
decision: “the normal meaning of ‘adjacent’ and ‘nearby;’” “the
availability of alternative closer sites;” “the physical lay-out of the
project;” and “whether the area was developed or undeveloped.”739
However, the hearing officer applied a different, narrower test.740
The supreme court applied the correct test to the factual findings
and determined that the location was not “on-site.”741
In Blackburn v. State,742 the supreme court held that
probationary state employees are at-will employees, dischargeable
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at any time with or without cause.743 Blackburn had worked for
the state for less than three months in early 2000, when the state
terminated him for inadequate performance, including failure to
follow instructions and failure to operate equipment in an
appropriate manner.744 Blackburn filed a grievance through his
union, which was dropped once the union learned of Blackburn’s
probationary status.745 Blackburn sued the state for wrongful
termination, denial of due process, and misrepresentation.746 The
supreme court, on appeal of a grant of summary judgment in favor
of the state, affirmed, holding that it could find nothing in the state
statutes, state personnel rules, or the collective bargaining
agreement to indicate that state probationary employees were not
employees at will.747 As an at-will employee, Blackburn did not
have a property right in his continued employment and, therefore,
was not denied due process.748
In Brown v. Patriot Maintenance, Inc.,749 the supreme court
affirmed the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board’s denial of
disability benefits.750 Brown claimed that she suffered from workrelated fibromyalgia; however, the independent medical examiners
expressed the opinion that her condition was psychiatric and not
work-related.751 After the Board denied her benefit, Brown argued
that the Board failed to resolve doubtful medical evidence in her
favor and failed to address her lay witnesses’ testimony.752 The
supreme court reaffirmed that the Board has the sole power to
determine how to weigh the evidence; thus, review of its decisions
is deferential.753 The court held that the rule requiring that doubt
be resolved in the claimant’s favor did not extend to Brown’s case
because the conflicting medical testimony simply represented a
difference of opinion and not a serious doubt as to any single
expert’s testimony.754 The supreme court further held that the lay
evidence in this case was not material, and the Board was not
required to discuss it at length.755 The supreme court reaffirmed
the denial of disability benefits, finding that the Board’s decision
was adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence.756
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In Casey v. SEMCO Energy, Inc.,757 the supreme court held
that an employer did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing when, acting on the advice of counsel, it declined to
include two terminated employees in an Early Retirement Plan
(ERP).758 Casey and Sinclair were employed as managers by
ENSTAR Natural Gas Company.759 In November 1999, SEMCO
Energy, Inc. purchased ENSTAR and terminated both Casey and
Sinclair.760 As part of a negotiated severance agreement, SEMCO
agreed to include Casey and Sinclair in an ERP established for
other former ENSTAR employees, provided that doing so would
not disqualify the ERP from tax-exempt status.761 According to
the terms of the agreement, determination of whether adding Casey
and Sinclair to the ERP would cause loss of tax-exempt status was
to be made by SEMCO's counsel and subject SEMCO's sole
judgment in good faith.762 In affirming the decision of the superior
court, the supreme court held that the terms of the agreement only
required SEMCO to obtain a good faith opinion from its counsel as
to how including the two managers would affect the ERP's taxexempt status.763 Having done this, SEMCO had no further
obligations to Casey and Sinclair with respect to the ERP.764 The
court concluded that under the agreement SEMCO was not
required to find alternative means of applying the benefits of the
ERP to Casey and Sinclair, nor did SEMCO violate the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to exhaust all possible
means of doing so.765
In Chalovich v. State,766 the supreme court held that
Chalovich made a timely payment and therefore did not abandon
his state mining claims.767 To maintain a mining claim, the Alaska
Administrative Code requires a miner either to put in some
minimum amount of labor each year or to make a payment by
September 1. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) found
that Chalovich had abandoned his state mining claims because he
failed to make a timely payment.768 Chalovich argued that even
though his payment was received after the deadline, the DNR
should treat his payment as timely.769 He also argued that the
757
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section of the code that requires annual labor is “arbitrary and
inconsistent with other regulatory deadlines.”770 The supreme
court held that the Alaska Administrative Code’s provision of
payment in lieu of annual labor by September 1 was valid,771
because it was “created by the legislature, and it is consistent with
federal law.”772 However, contrary to the provisions of the DNR
regulation, the court held that as long as a payment is postmarked
by September 1, forfeiture cannot be imposed on a miner.773
Because his payment was postmarked before the September 1
deadline, the court reversed DNR’s decision that Chalovich
forfeited his mining rights.774
In Cowen v. Wal-Mart,775 the supreme court held that the
medical opinions of two physician specialists constituted sufficient
evidence to allow the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board to
conclude that a claimed injury was not work-related.776 Cowen, an
employee of Wal-Mart, sought to receive workers’ compensation
benefits for the deflation of a saline implant.777 In arguing that
Cowen’s implant was not work-related, Wal-Mart relied upon the
expert opinions of two doctors.778 Cowen argued that these
medical opinions should not rebut the presumption of
compensability because they were speculative and
unsubstantiated.779 The court held that the medical opinions were
adequate to rebut the presumption of compensability, despite the
fact that the opinions contained a degree of medical uncertainty.780
The court affirmed the Board’s determination that Cowen failed to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury was workrelated.781
In Excursion Inlet Packing Co. v. Ugale,782 the supreme
court affirmed per curiam the superior court’s reversal of an
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decision to deny
compensation for Ugale’s death.783 Ugale’s family argued that his
death should be presumed compensable because it arose out of his
employment with Excursion Inlet Packing Co.784 However, the
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Board agreed with the employer that Ugale’s death was not
compensable because Ugale quit before he died and was no longer
on the premises when he disappeared.785 The superior court
reversed, finding that a presumption of compensability should
attach and that the employer failed to rebut that presumption with
any substantial evidence.786 The supreme court affirmed for
reasons set forth in the superior court opinion and reprinted that
opinion in an appendix.787
In Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey,788 the supreme
court held that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar a
retail manager from asserting overtime compensation claims under
the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) that were more than two
years old due to circumstances that prevented him from bringing
his claims earlier.789 While Bailey worked as a manager for Fred
Meyer he did not receive overtime compensation because the
company classified him as exempt.790 As a threshold matter, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Bailey devoted
nearly sixty percent of his time to non-management tasks and was
therefore not exempt under AWHA.791 The supreme court then
affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant recovery for the
company’s older violations, finding that the lower court’s equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations was proper. The court based its
finding on the fact that Bailey was prevented from bringing claims
because he was threatened by his employer from participation in
the earlier class action lawsuit alleging the same overtime
compensation claims.792
In Gunter v. Kathy-O-Estates,793 the supreme court held
that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board did not have the
authority to reimburse an employee for miscellaneous costs
incurred as a consequence of a work-related injury, and that his
guardian had the authority to dismiss the suit for reimbursement.794
Gunter, an employee of Kathy-O-Estates, was severely injured as a
result of an on-the-job accident and was entitled to benefits under
the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. 795 Gunter’s guardian and
attorney settled the workers’ compensation disputes by signing a
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Compromise and Release form.796 Nevertheless, Gunter argued
that Kathy-O-Estates should reimburse him for a variety of costs
he incurred subsequent to his injury.797 The supreme court held
that Gunter could not be reimbursed because the costs fell outside
the narrow confines of workers’ compensation benefits.798 Gunter
also challenged his guardian’s decision to dismiss his claims for
reimbursement.799 The court held that Gunter’s guardian was
properly appointed and therefore had the authority to reasonably
dismiss Gunter’s challenge to the Compromise and Release
form.800
In Hutka v. Sisters of Providence in Washington,801 the
supreme court held that the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA)
did not apply to a supervisory employee who cared for patients in a
nursing home.802 Hutka was a registered nurse who had been
promoted to a supervisory role at Providence Hospital’s Home
Healthcare Unit but who still provided direct medical care to
patients on a weekly basis.803 The court concluded that individuals
who provide direct medical care to patients as part of their regular
job duties are exempt from coverage under AWHA.804 The court
concluded, however, that the employer’s behavior constituted a
willful violation of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and upheld the lower court’s decision to allow a three-year, rather
than a two-year, statute of limitations on Hutka’s FLSA claims.805
In Kaiser v. Royal Insurance Co. of America,806 the
supreme court stayed an individual’s appeal of an Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board’s (“Board”) decision to deny his claims until
the validity of his Compromise and Release (“C&R”) could be
determined.807 The court also remanded for additional findings on
Kaiser’s claim of interference against the insurance company.808
Kaiser challenged the Board’s decision not to address the validity
of the C&R before denying his claims for reimbursement of
medical expenses. 809 He also argued that there should be an
imposition of penalties against the insurance company for late
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payment of an MRI.810 On appeal, Kaiser argued that the C&R
was not in his best interests, that the Board’s statements in favor of
the C&R were fraudulent, and that his agreement to the C&R was
made under duress.811 The court remanded the issue of whether the
C&R was valid.812 The court also ordered that the claim of
interference against the insurance company be remanded to
determine whether it inappropriately influenced or attempted to
inappropriately influence Kaiser’s physician.813
In Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling,814 the supreme court held
that Kinzel was entitled to a mixed motives instruction on his
retaliatory discharge claim against Discovery and reversed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment in Discovery’s favor.815 Kinsel
alleged that Discovery terminated him in retaliation for filing
safety complaints with the division of Occupational Safety and
Health (OSH).816 At trial, Kinzel’s request for a mixed-motive
instruction was denied.817 The supreme court reversed, holding
that email statements reflecting an animus based on Kinzel’s
protected conduct were sufficient to permit a jury to “infer that that
attitude was more likely than not a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision.”818
The supreme court also reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment on defamation and intentional interference
with a contract claim in favor of a second defendant, Hart
Crowser.819 It concluded that an email hypothesizing that Kinzel
sabotaged a work site could be interpreted as fact, not opinion.820
It also concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact as
to whether Hart Crowser was responsible for Kinzel’s firing, and
whether the company was motivated by privileged economic
interest or improper retaliatory interest. 821
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Gregg,822 the supreme
court held that the Municipality of Anchorage violated Gregg’s
right to protected leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).823 Gregg, an Anchorage police officer, had taken time
away from work on account of her pregnancy, an automobile
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accident, and an abusive personal relationship.824 The court
concluded that Gregg was entitled to protection under the FMLA
even though her doctors had not made a precise and correct
diagnosis of her condition at the time she requested leave under the
Act.825 The court also held that an employee does not have to
specifically invoke the FMLA when requesting leave for a covered
purpose and concluded that the appropriate rate of prejudgment
interest was set by federal, not state, law.826
In Odsather v. Richardson,827 the supreme court held that
the trial court had insufficient facts to decide conclusively whether
truck owners who leased their trucks to firms were employees of
the firm or independent contractors.828 Odsather was injured in a
vehicle accident with Richardson while both were working as truck
drivers.829 Though the men owned their trucks, both were on lease
to Sourdough Express.830 Odsather claimed that his injuries were
caused by Richardson’s negligence.831 Richardson claimed that
both he and Odsather were employees of Sourdough Express and
that Odsather’s only remedy was under worker’s compensation.832
Under Alaska’s “relative nature of the work” test, the court
examined the degree of skill required, whether the worker puts
himself out as a separate business, and whether the claimant bears
accident risk.833 The court reversed and remanded, holding that the
trial court did not have sufficient facts to decide whether, under the
relative nature of the work test, the drivers were employees of
Sourdough Express or independent contractors.834
In Raad v. Alaska State Commissionn for Human Rights,835
the supreme court held that a hearing officer of the Alaska State
Commission for Human Rights incorrectly concluded that there
was no evidence to support a finding of discriminatory
retaliation.836 Raad, a Muslim woman of Lebanese descent,
brought a complaint against the school district alleging she had
been the victim of discrimination on the basis of her religion and
national origin.837 Specifically, Raad pointed to the fact that, in
spite of her qualifications, she had been denied employment by the
824
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school district on thirty-one separate occasions.838 In reversing a
decision of the superior court upholding the hearing officer’s
dismissal of the retaliation claim, the supreme court noted that
while the school district had articulated legitimate reasons for its
decision not to hire Raad, she had presented evidence sufficient to
at least suggest that the reasons were merely pretextual.839 This
was inconsistent, the court held, with the hearing officer’s finding
that Raad had presented no evidence of pretext.840 Given this
inconsistency, the court reversed the decision of the superior court
and remanded the case for further consideration regarding the
evidence of pretext.841
X. ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In Matter of the Reinstatement of Wiederholt,842 the Alaska
Supreme Court accepted, without comment, the recommendation
of the Alaska Bar Association’s Disciplinary Board that Jon E.
Wiederholt not be reinstated as an attorney.843 The court attached
the Disciplinary Board’s recommendation to its opinion. Their
recommendation indicates that Wiederholt had been disbarred for
“extremely serious misconduct as an attorney.”844 The Bar’s
Hearing Committee recommended reinstatement on the condition
that Wiederholt meet regularly with a mentoring panel and that he
continue counseling until it was “not therapeutically beneficial.”845
Despite the Hearing Committee’s recommendation, the Bar’s
Disciplinary Board recommended against reinstatement.846 The
Disciplinary Board thought that Wiederholt had not had an
adequate amount of time to recover from the conditions that led to
his disbarment.847 The Board also believed that a supervised or
restricted practice, as recommended by the Hearing Committee,
was evidence that the Committee was not fully convinced of
Wiederholt’s readiness to resume practicing.848 Finally, the Board
noted that Wiederholt only seemed to take his rehabilitation
seriously after the supreme court rejected his first petition for
reinstatement.849
838

Id.
Id. at 909–10.
840
Id.
841
Id. at 911.
842
89 P.3d 771 (Alaska 2004).
843
Id.
844
Id. at 789
845
Id. at 788
846
Id. at 789–90
847
Id.
848
Id.
849
Id.
839

60

XI. FAMILY LAW
In Beal v. Beal850 the supreme court upheld both the grant
of interim spousal support and the majority of the superior court’s
findings as to the division of marital property.851 Following a
particularly lititgious and contentious divorce, the Beals each filed
a series of cross-appeals regarding the terms of the interim support
order and the division of their marital property.852 The court
upheld the grant of the interim spousal support, noting that the
explicit terms of the couple’s prenuptial agreement precluded only
post-divorce alimony.853 The court also affirmed the terms of the
interim spousal support, which included ordering the husband to
pay arrearages and late fees related to the marital residence and
property.854 Additionally, the court upheld the superior court’s
determinations as to each party’s credits, finding the following:
(1) parties are not credited appraisal costs related to non-neutral
appraisals, unless explicitly agreed to;855 (2) a party’s offer to pay
health insurance costs prior to the interim spousal support connotes
that the health insurance is in addition to the interim order;856 (3)
the superior court was correct as to various credits, regarding
specific marital property;857 and (4) the superior court correctly
ruled as to educational awards regarding the wife and children.858
The court did, however, reverse the superior court’s inclusion of
the parties’ separate property and the children’s property in
evaluation of the award,859 as well as the superior court’s failure to
account for appreciation of a premarital art collection.860 Finally,
the court remanded for the determination of specific factual
inquiries.861
In Brynna B. v. Department of Health and Human
Services,862 the supreme court affirmed a judgment of the superior
court refusing to place Brynna’s niece, Jaclyn, in her care.863 The
dispute arose when the Alaska Division of Family and Youth
Services (DFYS) removed Brynna’s six-week old niece from
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Brynna’s sister’s home.864 Brynna claimed that the superior court
misinterpreted the “relative placement preference” in Alaska
Statutes section 47.14.100 and that the superior court should have
ordered the State to place Jaclyn in her care.865 The supreme court
found that the superior court’s decision was not clearly erroneous
and Brynna’s likelihood of refusing instructions to keep Jaclyn
away from her unfit mother constituted clear and convincing
evidence that placing Jaclyn with Brynna would be harmful to the
child.866
In Carl N. v. State,867 the supreme court upheld the
termination of a father’s parental rights under the Indian Child
Welfare Act.868 The father had a history of mental and substance
abuse problems and had repeatedly failed to conform to a
reunification plan established by the Division of Family and Youth
Services.869 After the trial court terminated his parental rights, the
father appealed, claiming that he had remedied his conduct such
that there was no risk of serious emotional harm to his son and that
reunification was in his son’s best interest.870 The supreme court,
however, held that the father had shown only limited progress in
the treatment of his mental and substance abuse problems and
upheld the termination of his parental rights.871
In Cline v. Cline,872 the supreme court held that the superior
court abused its discretion by awarding more than 50% of Cline’s
pension to Lopez, his ex-wife, and remanded the case to calculate
the correct amount owed.873 In a 1992 divorce property division,
the trial judge awarded 18% of Cline’s pension to Lopez and set
$500 as the monthly payment amount.874 Ten years after
settlement, Lopez sued for a revision.875 The court awarded her
past benefits and interest but lowered the payment amount.876
Cline argued that this revision should apply retroactively because
the initial amount was too high.877 The supreme court, basing its
judgment on the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection
Act, 878 which limits apportionment of military retirement benefits
864
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to 50%, held that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
Lopez 62% of Cline’s pension.879 The supreme court reversed the
disposition of income and set the payment amount at 50% of
retirement benefits.880 The court also held that the imminent
reduction of Mr. Cline’s retirement income because of disability
payments was a proper matter for reconsideration under federal
law.881
In Edwards v. Edwards,882 the supreme court held that a
husband’s motion to hold a child support order in abeyance while
ex-wife and minor children continued to live with him was, in part,
a prospective modification of child support based on changed
circumstances.883 The divorce agreement of Paul and Doris
Edwards obligated Paul to pay child support for the couple’s two
minor children and Doris to leave the marital home, neither of
which was performed.884 The Child Support Enforcement Division
began to withhold a portion of Paul’s paycheck and Paul filed a
motion for abeyance while the children lived in his household.885
The motion largely sought impermissible retroactive modification
of the support order for the period during which Doris and the
children lived with him.886 However, the court remanded the case
so the superior court could make a determination as to whether the
motion also sought a prospective modification of the support
order.887
In Evans v. McTaggart,888 the supreme court held that a
third-party must meet a clear and convincing evidence standard
when applying for custody and visitation rights.889 Evans had two
children, both fathered by different men.890 The McTaggarts had
successfully filed in the trial court for custody of their biologically
related grandchild and visitation rights with Evan’s other child.891
On appeal, Evans claimed that the trial court violated her
constitutional rights as a parent by granting custody to the
McTaggarts based on a preponderance of the evidence. 892 The
supreme court held that in custody cases between parents and nonparents, the correct standard of review is the clear and convincing
879
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evidence standard.893 Evans also challenged the McTaggerts’
visitation rights to her other son, who was not biologically related
to them.894 The court held that Alaska Statutes section
25.20.060(a),895 which “permits a court to provide for visitation
based on the best interests of the child,” is constitutional if
narrowly interpreted. 896 To protect parental rights, the court held
that clear and convincing evidence should be used to determine
whether a third-party can obtain visitation rights over the parent’s
consent.897
In Harris v. Westfall,898 the supreme court vacated a child
support order proposed by the father, Westfall, and adopted by the
superior court, finding that the order contained misrepresentations
made by Westfall and that the mother, Harris’s, untimely objection
was justified by the circumstances. 899 On May 31, 2002 Harris
moved to set aside the child support order granted by the superior
court on December 27, 2001.900 Harris claimed that her objections
to the proposed child support order were not timely filed because
her attorney’s secretary had been sabotaging several cases and
never filed her objections.901 The superior court denied the motion
without explanation.902 After her motion for clarification was
denied, Harris appealed to the supreme court.903 The supreme
court held that the superior court abused its discretion by denying
Harris’s motion to vacate the child support order under Alaska
Civil Rule 60(b).904 The supreme court held that Harris’s motion
was timely filed given her reasonable explanation for the delay in
filing her motion to set aside the superior court’s child support
order. The court also held that because the order was obtained
inadvertently through Westfall’s misrepresentations, it could be set
aside under Rule 60(b).905 As a result, the supreme court vacated
the child support order and remanded for recalculation of the child
support due.906
In Keturi v. Keturi,907 the supreme court affirmed in part
and reversed in part several determinations regarding child
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support, marital property, and income in divorce proceedings.908
Troy Keturi appealed several factual findings made by the trial
court during his divorce proceedings, namely the court’s decisions:
(1) to average four years of his income for child support purposes,
(2) that Troy’s arthritic illness would not affect his earning
potential in the next three to four years, (3) that various properties
were purchased with a loan or were a marital asset, and (4) the
determination of his income in the year 1997.909 The court upheld
the first three findings, but held that the determination of Keturi’s
income in 1997 was clearly erroneous.910 The superior court’s
determination of Troy’s income for 1997 was deemed clearly
erroneous due to a lack of any evidence to support the court’s
findings.911 As a result, the court remanded for recalculation of
child support.912
In Louise A. v. State,913 the supreme court held that the
increased chance for adoption of a child in need of aid warrants the
termination of parental rights even if no prospective adoptive
parent has been identified.914 The superior court found Louise A.’s
son to be a “child in need of aid” and that the child was still
exposed to a substantial risk of harm. It therefore terminated
Louise A.’s parental rights.915 The court rejected Louise A.’s
argument that termination is not in the best interests of her son
because he would lose inheritance rights and because his chances
for adoption were low.916 The supreme court upheld the
termination because the court was not required to consider
inheritance rights and because the benefits to the child of being
available for adoption were sufficient to make termination of his
mother’s parental rights in his best interest.917
In Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch,918 the supreme court held
that in a custody proceeding where one parent is contemplating
relocation, a complete analysis of the child’s best interests must
consider the effect on the child of separation from both the moving
and the non-moving parents.919 A mother appealed a custody order
that granted primary physical custody to the father on the
assumption that she would move out of Alaska.920 The mother
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contended that the superior court placed too much emphasis on the
geographic stability factor in awarding custody to the father.921
The supreme court held that the superior court erred by analyzing
the geographic stability factor narrowly and that the superior court
should have evaluated the harm to the child if he were separated
from his mother upon her relocation.922
In Morgan B. v. State,923 the supreme court held that
termination of parental rights does not require the court to specify
whether the sexual abuse that places a child “in need of aid” is the
result of abuse by the parent or whether the parent allowed the
abuse to occur.924 After Morgan’s child was found to be in need of
aid, his parental rights were terminated because the court found
that the child was still exposed to a substantial risk of harm.925
Morgan argued that his daughter was not a child in need of aid and
that the findings were deficient because the court did not specify
whether he personally was at fault for the abuse or whether he
negligently allowed others to abuse the child.926 The supreme
court held that the statute did not turn on whether the abuse was by
the parent or by conditions created by the parent and under the
statute there was no need to “pinpoint” the abusers.927 The court
therefore upheld the termination of Morgan B.’s parental rights
based on a clear finding of sexual abuse.928
In Murphy v. Murphy,929 the supreme court held that a
mother was owed child support reimbursement for prepaid
payments when she was awarded interim custody of the children
after obtaining a domestic violence protective order against the
children’s custodian-father.930 The court held that the mother was
entitled to child support for the interim custody only after she
served her motion to modify.931 The court also affirmed that if
there is an existing support agreement and a de facto shift in
custody occurs, the rule prohibiting retroactive modification also
prohibits modifying support payments owed before the date of the
motion to modify.932
In Nelson M. v. State,933 the supreme court held that the
state actively attempted to prevent the breakup of an Indian family
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and that parental rights should be terminated in the best interest of
the child.934 The Alaska Division of Family and Youth Services
(DFYS) received numerous reports that Nelson and Dora neglected
their child, Jason, who was often a witness to domestic violence
between the two.935 A DFYS social worker organized a plan that
provided alcohol treatment, parental training, anger management,
and mental health counseling for the parents,936 but the state later
filed for termination of Dora and Nelson’s parental rights.937 The
supreme court affirmed the termination of parental rights because,
despite DFYS’s efforts, neither parent participated in the
counseling and treatment programs offered.938 Furthermore,
Jason’s health had improved in foster care.939 The court held that it
was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that
terminating the parents’ parental rights was in the best interest of
the child.940
In Nunley v. State,941 the supreme court upheld a revenue
examiner’s determination that Nunley was voluntarily
underemployed and affirmed child support payments in the amount
of $209 a month.942 A revenue hearing examiner from the
Department of Revenue found Nunley to be voluntarily
underemployed and ordered child support payments based on his
earning potential.943 Nunley appealed, claiming that he faces
limited employment opportunities due to a criminal record and that
he could not afford $209 a month.944 The supreme court affirmed
the examiner’s decision and upheld the child support payments,
finding that the decision was supported by substantial evidence and
that the amount of income imputed to Nunley was reasonable.945
The court also noted that Nunley had many marketable skills and
the primary obstacle to his employment was his unwillingness to
seek it.946
In Ruth S. v. State,947 the supreme court held that the state
was not equitably estopped from petitioning for termination of
parental rights because one of the goals was reunification.948 Ruth
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S. and the Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) agreed
to a case plan regarding Ruth’s two minor children.949 While the
plan contained concurrent goals of reunification and adoption,950
DFYS eventually informed Ruth that due to Ruth’s difficulties
with alcoholism, frequent relapses, and the special needs of the
children, the department’s goal was adoption.951 The court held
that because DFYS never stated that it would refrain from pursuing
termination of parental rights, and actually made its intention to
terminate clear, it was not equitably estopped from petitioning to
terminate parental rights.952
In Schmitz v. Schmitz,953 the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s decision to award shared custody when the child
turned five, but reversed the trial court’s ruling that various
accounts were the separate property of Michael, the father, and
vacated a ruling that one of Michael’s businesses was his separate
property.954
The mother, Christina, appealed the award of future shared
custody to the Michael, claiming that the order had no evidentiary
basis and violated her due process rights.955 The court held that the
trial court appropriately considered the factors specified by Alaska
Statutes section 25.24.150(c),956 including the child’s lack of
special needs, Michael’s desire to change his life to better provide
for his son, and the child’s need to have contact with his father in
the future.957 The court held that because all procedural
requirements were met, Christina’s due process rights were not
violated.958 The superior court, therefore, properly awarded shared
custody after the child’s fifth birthday and the order was
affirmed.959
Christina also appealed the superior court’s designation of
Michael’s businesses, bank accounts, stock accounts and IRA as
separate, non-marital property.960 The court vacated the trial
court’s holding that one business, Schmitz & Buck, was separate
property, and remanded to allow Christina to present evidence
under the active appreciation doctrine.961 The court held, however,
that Christina failed to demonstrate the element of marital
949
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contribution for the other business, the Nugget Men’s Store, and
thus the separate property designation for that business was
appropriate.962 The court found that because the stock accounts,
bank accounts and IRA each increased in value during the marital
period, the designation of these assets as separate property was
inappropriate.963 The superior court’s holdings with respect to
these assets were therefore reversed and remanded.964
In Stanley B. v. State,965 the supreme court concluded that
there was clear and convincing evidence that a father’s criminal
conduct, incarceration, and substance abuse impaired his ability to
parent his children, and thus his children were “children in need of
aid.”966 The court therefore affirmed the lower court’s decision
terminating the father’s parental rights to his two children.967 The
court applied the “clearly erroneous standard” to its review of the
factual findings underlying the termination of parental rights.968
The supreme court noted that the children’s father has a significant
addiction to illegal substances which has resulted in his
incarceration for lengthy periods throughout his children’s
minority, that there was no other parent to care for the children,
and that the father had failed to provide for the children’s care
during his incarceration.969 Under these circumstances, Alaska law
allows a court to declare such children to be “children in need of
aid.”970 The court also affirmed the lower court’s holding that the
Department of Youth and Family Services had made reasonable
efforts to provide family support services to the children’s
family.971
In State v. DeLeon,972 the supreme court held that the
superior court has the authority to order a delinquent father to
either apply for a Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) in order to pay
court-ordered child support or to demonstrate his ineligibility for
the dividend.973 The superior court denied a motion by the state to
order DeLeon to apply for a PFD on the grounds that it had no
statutory or inherent authority to issue the order.974 The supreme
court found that this authority existed both expressly under Alaska
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Statutes section 22.10.020975 and inherently as part of the superior
court’s equitable authority.976 The supreme court further held that
the purpose behind the Alaska child support scheme was to ensure
that parents met their child support obligations, and denying the
superior court the power to grant the motion the state requested
would have frustrated that purpose.977 The court reversed the order
of the superior court and remanded the matter for consideration of
whether the circumstances warranted issuing the requested
order.978
In Weber v. State,979 the supreme court affirmed child
support payments, but reversed as to a hearing officer’s calculation
of income and therefore remanded for further consideration.980
The Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) modified
Weber’s child support obligation from $158 to $452 per month.981
A hearing officer based the obligation on an estimated annual
income of $27,146.982 The supreme court held that CSED did not
err in modifying Weber’s support obligation.983 First, Weber was
not below the poverty line.984 Second, while the agency itself
agreed not to initiate a modification, the current modification was
initiated by Weber’s ex-wife.985 Third, Weber cannot challenge
his current payment because he had paid support for his sons
despite the fact that they lived with him in the past.986 Fourth,
CSED has authority to order post-majority support.987 Finally,
Weber was not denied due process; he says he was denied a copy
of his file before the hearing but the record showed he did not
request a copy until the hearing itself.988 However, the court held
that CSED’s determination of income was not supported by
substantial evidence.989 Therefore, the court upheld the superior
court decision in part, reversed in part, and remanded to CSED for
further proceedings.990
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XII. PROPERTY LAW
In Adams v. Adams,991 the supreme court held that a party
commits constructive frauds by changing a lease term without
informing the other party to the lease.992 Although it was a
departure from prior negotiations, Don Adams, on behalf of Alaska
Rubber, changed a right of first refusal to a purchase option in the
final draft of a lease agreement, without providing notice to
Michael Adams.993 The supreme court held that, while Don
Adams may not have intended to deceive Michael Adams, it was
obligated to inform him of the change.994 However, since Michael
Adams had reasonable opportunity to read the lease before signing
it, the lease was voidable, not void.995 If Adams knew of the
misrepresentation he would have lost the power to void the lease
by agreeing to extend it, and the court remanded the case to
determine whether Adams had actual knowledge that the lease
contained the option to buy.996
In Alaska Action Center, Inc. v. Municipality of
Anchorage,997 the supreme court affirmed a municipal clerk’s
refusal to certify a petition that would have the effect of preserving
much of the lower end of Girdwood valley as a park.998
Anchorage owns several hundred acres of undeveloped land in
Girdwood Valley.999 Citizens of Girdwood proposed an initiative
that would amend Anchorage’s charter and designate 730 acres as
a park.1000 The municipal clerk refused to certify the petition.1001
The court upheld the authority of the municipal clerk to reject the
initiative on subject-matter grounds.1002 The court held that the
Girdwood initiative would make an improper appropriation,1003
and that no section of the initiative could be certified.1004
In Baskurk v.Beal,1005 the supreme court held that a bulk
foreclosure sale of two adjoining parcels of property was
voidable.1006 At a foreclosure sale, Baskurt purchased two parcels
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of land for one dollar more than what Beal, the defaulting debtor,
owed on the property.1007 The supreme court held that a
foreclosure sale may be voidable when the price paid is “grossly
inadequate when compared to the fair market value of the property
on the date of the foreclosure sale” and when the trustee fails to
take reasonable steps to protect the debtor’s interests in the
property.1008 Here, the court found that the sale price, which was
fifteen percent of the fair market value, was grossly inadequate.1009
Further, the court found the trustee breached her fiduciary duties to
Beal in selling both parcels in bulk because the sale of only one
parcel would have satisfied Beal’s debt.1010
In Chickaloon-Moose Creek Native Association, Inc. v.
Norton,1011 the Ninth Circuit held that the Department of Interior’s
decision to convey federal government lands to a regional
corporation for reconveyance to Native villages was proper and
that, pursuant to the terms of the Deficiency Agreement, those
lands listed in Appendix A must be conveyed prior to those lands
listed in Appendix C.1012 In 1976, the Deficiency Agreement was
adopted as a compromise intended to ameliorate problems with an
earlier agreement to distribute land from the public domain to
Native villages after all aboriginal title to land in Alaska was
extinguished in 1971.1013 The Deficiency Agreement was an
attempt to resolve a dispute in which it was alleged that the
Department of Interior distributed lands of much lower quality
than those surrounding Native villages and rendered the latter
ineligible for withdrawal.1014 The court held that the language of
the Deficiency Agreement was clear and unambiguous and
precluded the conveyance of certain lands until those lands listed
in Appendix A of the agreement were exhausted.1015 The court
also held that there was no mutual intent of the parties contrary to
the language of the agreement.1016
In Cline v. Cline,1017 the supreme court held that the
superior court abused its discretion by awarding more than 50% of
Cline’s pension to Lopez, his ex-wife, and remanded the case to
calculate the correct amount owed.1018 In a 1992 divorce property
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division, the trial judge awarded 18% of Cline’s pension to Lopez
and set $500 as the monthly payment amount.1019 Ten years after
settlement, Lopez sued for a revision.1020 The court awarded her
past benefits and interest but lowered the payment amount.1021
Cline argued that this revision should apply retroactively because
the initial amount was too high.1022 The supreme court, basing its
judgment on the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection
Act, 1023 which limits apportionment of military retirement benefits
to 50%, held that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding
Lopez 62% of Cline’s pension.1024 The supreme court reversed the
disposition of income and set the payment amount at 50% of
retirement benefits.1025 The court also held that the imminent
reduction of Mr. Cline’s retirement income because of disability
payments was a proper matter for reconsideration under federal
law.1026
In Dykstra v. Municipality of Anchorage,1027 the supreme
court held that Dykstra’s use of his property to accommodate his
car collection of twenty or more cars violated the applicable zoning
statute.1028 Dykstra claimed that the use of his property to collect
cars was permissible as an accessory use, or, in the alternative, that
the zoning provisions were unconstitutionally vague.1029 Noting
that the issue was one of first impression in Alaska, the court relied
on precedent from other jurisdictions to determine that an
accessory use of property becomes impermissible when the
property owner’s use involves unreasonable or uncommon
extremes.1030 The court also held that the adopted approach to
accessory use was flexible without being impermissibly vague, and
therefore, was not unconstitutional.1031 The court remanded the
case for further findings based on the zoning board’s failure to
adopt specific findings and to give Dykstra reasonable notice of the
steps necessary to remedy his violation.1032
The supreme court also held that, in drafting and passing
ARCA, the legislature did not create the railroad under the
presumption that it would be immune from local zoning
1019
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ordinances.1033 The supreme court concluded that a balancing-ofinterests test was the appropriate tool to discern legislative intent
when a law and its legislative history provided no clear indication
of intent.1034 Under this test, the governmental entity seeking
immunity has the burden to prove that the balance of certain
factors favors immunity.1035 However, the supreme court further
held that it was not appropriate for courts to apply this test unless
the state had first made “a reasonable good faith attempt to comply
with local zoning laws.”1036 Finally, the supreme court held that the
railroad must apply for the conditional use permit and fail in that
application before further proceedings on the issue of immunity
could be heard.1037
In Fyffe v. Wright,1038 the supreme court held that a
landlord who disposes of a tenant’s personal property without
notice is entitled to present evidence to offset the damages award
to the tenant in a later suit.1039 Fyffe moved out of the home she
rented from Wright, but left some of her belongings in a shed on
the property.1040 When she returned to claim the items, she learned
that Wright had given them to charity.1041 The superior court
awarded damages to Fyffe, but offset the award by the amount she
owed Wright for past rent and damage to the rental property.1042
The supreme court affirmed to prevent injustice to Wright.1043
In Glover v. Glover,1044 the supreme court held that a
former tenant asserting adverse possession must give clear and
distinct notice that his claim is hostile to the true owner of the
property.1045 Clara Glover sued to quiet title in a contested lot that
had changed hands several times in the previous forty years.1046
The superior court found that the former tenant acquired the lot
through adverse possession—though initial occupancy was
permissive, the lot was eventually sold and the tenant’s possession
became hostile.1047 The supreme court held that neither transfer of
property nor non-payment of rent automatically changes
permissive occupancy to hostile possession, and remanded to
1033
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determine whether the former tenant’s claim was based on a
distinct and positive assertion of ownership.1048
In Native Village of Eklutna v Alaska Railroad Corp.,1049
the supreme court held that the Alaska Railroad Corporation Act
(“ARCA”)1050 did not grant the Alaska Railroad Corporation
immunity from local zoning laws.1051 The Native Village of
Eklutna sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the railroad
from carrying out blasting operations in a quarry owned by the
railroad on land adjacent to the village.1052 Eklutna argued that the
railroad had not obtained the conditional use permit required to
operate the quarry under a local zoning ordinance.1053 The railroad
maintained that it was not subject to the ordinance because ARCA
and its legislative history showed that the legislature intended for
the railroad to be immune from local zoning laws.1054 The superior
court’s decision had found that the railroad possessed such
immunity.1055 In reversing, the supreme court held that ARCA and
its legislative history provided no clear indication of the
legislature’s intent regarding the authority of local zoning laws
over the railroad.1056
In Norville v. Carr-Gottstein Foods Co.,1057 the supreme
court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendants and
remanded for determination as to whether a landlord’s refusal to
consent to a tenant’s sublease was unreasonable.1058 Norville
refused to permit Safeway (who had bought out Carr-Gottstein
Foods Co.) to sublease a portion of their supermarket to a bank
without awarding him 75% of the sublease rent.1059 Safeway
accepted Norville’s terms but initiated legal proceedings that
Norville’s conditions were unreasonable and in violation of their
original lease.1060 The court rejected Safeway’s first argument that
Norville could not object to the sublease because the use of said
space would be permitted to the tenant under the lease.1061 Instead,
the court found that a refusal of a sublease is permitted if such
refusal is commercially reasonable.1062 The court reversed and
1048
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remanded the case to determine whether Norville’s reasons were
genuine and reasonable under the circumstances at hand.1063
In Rush v. Department of Natural Resources,1064 the
supreme court affirmed the Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) decision that, under Alaska Statute section 38.05.090, the
auction purchaser of formerly leased land must pay the lessee the
value of the buildings and fixtures the lessee owned on the
property.1065 A non-profit organization attempted to buy the land it
leased and on which it managed a hatchery.1066 DNR decided to
sell the land at auction.1067 If the non-profit was not the auction
winner, the buyer was required to purchase the non-profit’s
buildings.1068 Rush, a neighbor, challenged this ruling, arguing
that amendments to Section 38.05.090 no longer required this
purchase.1069 The supreme court found that the amended version
of the statute was not intended to be applied retroactively and
could not be applied if it had a retroactive effect.1070 The court
held that applying the amended version rather than the statute as it
stood at the time the lease commenced would have an
impermissible retroactive effect because it substantively altered the
disposition of proceeds from the property’s sale.1071 The court
held that the former version of the statute should be applied.1072
In Soules v. Ramstack,1073 the supreme court held the Estate
of Pauline King responsible for a special assessment fee for the
condominium that the estate sold to Ramstack.1074 The condo
association informed all homeowners, including King’s estate, that
a special assessment fee had been levied and also advised
homeowners attempting to sell their units to deposit the fee upon
closing.1075 Soules, representing King’s estate, argued that
Ramstack should pay the fee because the estate sold the condo
before the fee was due, and Ramstack would be unjustly enriched
if the estate paid the fee.1076 The court held that debts can exist
before they are due and the fee was an existing obligation at the
time of the condo’s sale.1077 The court rejected Soules’ unjust
1063
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enrichment claim because Ramstack paid fair value for the condo
and the estate would be required merely to fulfill a prior
contractual obligation.1078
In Zok v. Estate of Collins,1079 the supreme court held that a
fraudulent conveyance claim should have been further investigated
before the court ordered an estate closed.1080 Zok sued his
attorney, Collins, for malpractice.1081 Before Zok could file suit,
however, Collins transferred parcels of real property to the Collins
Family Trust.1082 After Collins died a year later, probate
proceedings were opened by his personal representative.1083 Zok
filed a written objection to the closing of the estate without
consideration of his claim.1084 However, the probate court did not
address this claim or provide Zok with a hearing on this issue.1085
On appeal, Zok argued that he was not given notice that his
fraudulent conveyance claims would be tried at the probate hearing
and that it was error to close the estate before the claims were
resolved.1086 The court held that Zok was not given proper
notice.1087 Furthermore, the court held that Zok’s fraudulent
conveyance claim should have been adjudicated before the estate
was closed.1088
XIII. TORT LAW
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Teel,1089 the supreme court held
that the phrase “insured person” in an insurance policy provision
covered an individual claiming negligent infliction of emotional
distress from the death of an occupant in an insured automobile.1090
Teel’s son died from injuries resulting from a drunk driving
accident.1091 After collecting $50,000, the limit under the drunk
driver’s policy, Teel was denied a claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress under the her own policy’s
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists (UM/UIM) provisions.1092 Teel
sued her insurance agency, Allstate, arguing that she was legally
1078
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entitled to recover under the UM/UIM provisions of her policy and
that Allstate employees had fraudulently persuaded her to accept
the limits of her own policy’s UM/UIM provisions at
arbitration.1093 Allstate claimed that Teel was not an “insured
person” under the UM/UIM provisions because her injuries were
not derivative and that the coverage under the policy had already
been exhausted.1094 The supreme court held that Teel was an
“insured person” under the policy, upholding the superior court’s
ruling that the UM/UIM provisions cover not only derivative
injuries, but also injuries that are legally caused by and are the
foreseeable result of injury to the insured or a close relative of the
insured.1095
In Bryson v. Banner Health System,1096 the supreme court
held that the Family Recovery Center owed a patient a limited but
actionable duty of care to protect her from foreseeable harm in the
course of her treatment.1097 Bryson was attacked by a fellow
patient at the Center, a substance abuse outpatient treatment
facility.1098 After the attack, Bryson filed suit against the Center
alleging negligence on the part of the facility for failure to warn
and protect her from the other patient, whom the Center knew to be
dangerous.1099 The Center asserted that federal regulations
precluded it from divulging the confidential treatment records or
criminal history of patients, and thus, that it had no duty to warn its
patients.1100 Considering the parties’ motions for summary
judgment, the superior court held that the Center could have taken
actions to warn or protect Bryson during her treatment without
violating its statutory duty of confidentiality, and thus there
remained a triable issue of fact regarding the relation-specific
duty.1101 On interlocutory review, Bryson argued that the duty of
the Center should not be limited to the patient-treatment context,
and the Center argued that the lower court erred in finding an
actionable duty.1102 The supreme court held that when the Center
undertook to treat Bryson it formed a “special relationship” that
gave rise to a reasonable duty of care.1103 The supreme court
further agreed with the superior court that the Center could have
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taken steps to warn or protect Bryson notwithstanding a statutory
duty of confidentiality.1104
In City of Bethel v. Peters,1105 the supreme court held that
Alaska Rule of Evidence 407 does not preclude admission of a
redacted post-accident report.1106 Peters fell in a city-owned senior
center and brought a successful suit for negligence against the
city.1107 At trial, a report prepared by the city’s director of senior
services following the accident was entered into evidence.1108 This
report noted that following Peters’s accident, safety bars were
installed in the shower area to prevent falls.1109 However, the
portion of the report detailing what corrective actions were taken
was redacted.1110 The supreme court held that while Rule 407 bars
the admission of evidence showing remedial corrective measures,
the redacted report was not excludable on these grounds.1111
In Ledgends, Inc. v. Kerr,1112 the supreme court, in a per
curiam decision, affirmed the superior court’s decision rejecting
Ledgends’s affirmative defense based upon a release signed by
Kerr.1113 Kerr sued a health club after injuring her knee as a result
of a fall from a climbing wall, alleging negligence by the club for
failing to keep the premises in a “reasonably safe condition.”1114
The key issue at trial involved a release signed by Kerr prior to
climbing the wall.1115 The superior court found the release
ambiguous as to its scope, and, employing a narrow reading,
declined to interpret it as a release from all negligence by the
club.1116 The supreme court issued a brief per curium opinion
which expressly adopted the reasoning of the superior court and
affirmed its decision.1117
In Parker v. Tomera,1118 the supreme court held that a
plaintiff is required to support a medical malpractice claim with
expert testimony1119 and that a court is not required to appoint an
expert advisory panel in all medical malpractice cases.1120 Parker
1104

Id. at 806.
97 P.3d 822 (Alaska 2004).
1106
Id. at 824.
1107
Id.
1108
Id. at 825.
1109
Id. at 824–25.
1110
Id. at 825.
1111
Id. at 827.
1112
91 P.3d 960 (Alaska 2004) (per curiam).
1113
Id. at 961.
1114
Id. at 960–61.
1115
Id. at 961.
1116
Id. at 963.
1117
Id. at 961.
1118
89 P.3d 761 (Alaska 2004).
1119
Id. at 763.
1120
Id. at 767–68.
1105

79

visited a urologist, Tomera, to have his urinary problems
evaluated.1121 Tomera and his staff performed a procedure known
as a Parson’s Test in an attempt to diagnose Parker’s ailment.1122
Parker brought suit against Tomera alleging that he experienced
sexual dysfunction as a result of this procedure.1123 The statute1124
that governs medical malpractice claims places the burden of proof
on the plaintiff.1125 Because his injury was technical in nature, the
supreme court held that Parker was required to support his claim
with expert testimony.1126 Parker’s failure to provide an expert
made summary judgment on his medical malpractice claim
appropriate.1127 Further, the supreme court held that the superior
court’s decision not to appoint an expert advisory panel was not in
error because the specific circumstances of the case made it
impossible to find three neutral panel members.1128
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